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Notes 
FACEBOOK OFF LIMITS?  PROTECTING 
TEACHERS’ PRIVATE SPEECH ON SOCIAL 
NETWORKING SITES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that every year Lisa, a middle school English teacher in her 
late twenties, takes a trip to the Bahamas with a group of her closest 
girlfriends from college.1  When she returns from the trip, she posts a 
photo of herself standing on the beach holding an alcoholic beverage on 
her Facebook profile.  There is nothing revealing or inappropriate about 
the photo; however, a student’s parent gains access to Lisa’s Facebook 
profile and contacts Lisa’s principal, voicing her concern regarding Lisa’s 
recent posting.  The next day, Lisa is called into the principal’s office 
where the principal asks her a series of questions regarding her Facebook 
use.  Shortly thereafter, Lisa is dismissed from her teaching position at 
the middle school for “immoral misconduct.” 
Now, take another hypothetical.  This time, imagine Michelle, a high 
school teacher in her mid-twenties, who posts a similar photo to the one 
that Lisa had posted.2  Michelle is on the beach, in a bathing suit, holding 
an alcoholic beverage.  This time, however, one of Michelle’s male 
students, who is friends with Michelle on Facebook, comments, looking 
sexy, on the photo.  In response, Michelle sends her student a message 
via Facebook composed of explicit, sexual references.  The conversations 
between Michelle and her student progress to a physical level and 
ultimately result in a sexual relationship.  The student’s parents uncover 
the Facebook messages between Michelle and their son and contact both 
the principal and the police.  Like Lisa, Michelle is dismissed from her 
high school teaching position. 
Although these two situations are similar in respect to teachers’ use 
of Facebook, the two teachers were dismissed for very different reasons.  
In the first situation, the teacher was dismissed because a parent gained 
access to the teacher’s profile and saw a seemingly innocent photograph 
posted to a Facebook wall.  However, in the second situation, the teacher 
was dismissed because of the inappropriate conduct between the teacher 
                                                 
1 This scenario is fictional and solely the work of the author to illustrate the issues 
presented in this Note. 
2 This scenario is fictional and solely the work of the author to illustrate the issues 
presented in this Note. 
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and one of her minor students.  Should these two teachers be treated the 
same based on their use of a popular social media website?  Each 
instance resulted in the dismissal of the individual from her teaching 
position; however, many would argue that dismissal in the first case was 
unwarranted.3  Indeed, some contend that dismissal in the first situation 
infringes on a teacher’s First Amendment free speech rights, rights that 
must be protected.4  Due to the inappropriate conduct of the teacher in 
the second scenario, it is easy to determine that dismissal from her 
position was warranted. 
These situations briefly highlight the issues that arise when teachers 
use social networking websites like Facebook.5  To date, school boards 
and administrators have dealt with problems that have surfaced from 
teachers’ use of social networking sites.  One way that school boards 
have combatted this problem is by implementing district-level school 
board policies and acceptable use agreements, which restrict the use of 
social networking sites.6  In fact, one state has gone so far as to prohibit 
parents, who are also teachers, from “friending” their children, who are 
students, on Facebook.7  In light of such existing measures, teachers have 
been dismissed, suspended, and even coerced into resignation for what 
school administrators consider inappropriate use of social networking 
sites.8  In response, teachers have threatened and filed claims in district 
                                                 
3 See Constance Lindner, Teacher Fired Over ‘Friending,’ BOS. GLOBE (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2011/05/26/facebook_misstep_gets_abingt
on_substitute_teacher_fired/ (“An Abington High School substitute teacher and boys’ 
tennis coach has been fired following what school officials deemed his ‘inappropriate 
communication’ with students on Facebook.”).  “We have an ethics policy about 
appropriate boundaries and behavior, and certainly ‘friending’ students on a social 
network is not an appropriate boundary to cross,” stated the Abington School 
Superintendent Peter Schafer.  Id.  See infra note 25 (describing various teacher dismissals 
resulting from teachers’ Facebook use). 
4 See infra Part II.C (discussing public employees’ free speech rights protected under the 
First Amendment). 
5 See infra note 17 (describing the increased use of Facebook by individuals of all walks 
of life).  See generally Emily M. Janoski-Haehlen, The Courts Are All A "Twitter': The 
Implications of Social Media Use in the Courts, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 43 (2011) (illustrating the 
various methods in which social networking sites that have influenced and impacted 
courtrooms, judges and juries). 
6 See infra Part II.B (describing district-level policies and acceptable use agreements 
restricting teachers’ social networking use). 
7 See infra Part II.B (detailing a Missouri statute that prohibits virtually all teacher-
student communication via online social networking sites). 
8 See infra Part II.B (providing an overview of current disciplinary actions taken against 
teachers).  See generally Shelbie J. Byers, Note, Untangling the World Wide Weblog:  A Proposal 
for Blogging, Employment-at-Will, and Lifestyle Discrimination Statutes, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 245 
(2007) (discussing disciplinary actions taken against employees for their online blogging).  
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courts for violations of their First Amendment and due process rights.9  
There is clearly a need to balance the rights of teachers, as private 
citizens outside the school setting, and the rights of school 
administrators looking out for the best interests of students.10 
This Note seeks to provide the means for teachers to maintain their 
First Amendment rights despite schools’ interests in restricting teachers’ 
use of online social networking sites.11  First, Part II of this Note 
describes the existing conflict between teachers’ right to communicate 
via social networking sites and school boards’ interests in restricting 
such communication, and explains the analytical framework employed 
by the courts in addressing teachers’ First Amendment rights.12  Second, 
Part III analyzes the Supreme Court’s approach for when a teacher’s 
speech is entitled to First Amendment protection and also evaluates the 
adequacy of the Court’s approach when applied to cases involving both 
teachers’ inappropriate and appropriate speech via social networking 
sites.13  Finally, Part IV proposes a new test, which should be employed 
by the courts to determine whether, if at all, the Pickering-Connick 
analysis should be applied to teachers’ speech via social networking 
sites.14 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Social networking websites such as Facebook, Myspace, and Twitter 
have revolutionized communication on the Internet.15  By making 
                                                 
9 See Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *1, *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 
3, 2008) (claiming First Amendment protection after the teacher was disciplined for her 
speech via a social networking site); Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 299 (D. 
Conn. 2008) (claiming First Amendment protection after the teacher was disciplined for his 
Myspace activities). 
10 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the rights of teachers and school boards and evaluating 
the proper balance of such rights). 
11 See infra Part IV (arguing that teachers’ fundamental rights outweigh school boards’ 
interest in restricting teacher’s private communications via social networking sites and 
proposing a new test that courts should use when addressing teachers’ free speech claims). 
12 See infra Part II.A–C (providing an overview of the conflict and competing interests of 
teachers and school administrators, the current restrictions imposed on teachers’ social 
networking use, and the analytical framework used to address teachers’ First Amendment 
claims). 
13 See infra Part III (examining the analytical frameworks developed by the Supreme 
Court in addressing public employees’ First Amendment claims). 
14 See infra Part IV (arguing that both teachers and school boards should provide policies 
and guidelines for appropriate teacher social networking use and not provide sole 
discretion to school boards). 
15 See Stuart Elliott, Report Details Rise of Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2011), 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/report-details-rise-of-social-media/ 
(“Social media is becoming increasingly mainstream . . . . The social media brand that 
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communication as easy as the click of a button, communicating via 
Facebook is quickly becoming a substitute for a telephone call, an email, 
or even a text message.16  What once began as a social networking outlet 
exclusively for college students, now captivates people of all ages, 
professions, and cultures.17  Facebook’s platform is one of the most 
popular means for sharing personal information, keeping in contact with 
old and new friends, and even conducting business.18  As of July 2011, 
                                                                                                             
Americans spend the most time with, the report finds, is Facebook, by an enormous 
margin.”); A World of Connections, ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/15351002 (detailing the popularity of social networking sites like Facebook, Myspace, 
and Twitter, which provide great tools for mass communication).  Although the same 
issues can be seen in all social media communications, the author will use Facebook to 
reference all social networking media throughout this Note. 
16 See Sajai Singh, Anti-Social Networking:  Learning the Art of Making Enemies in Web 2.0, 
12 J. INTERNET L. 3, 3–4 (2008) (explaining the various benefits of social networking 
websites).  “The common thread among most social networking Web sites is that they 
combine email, instant messaging, blogs, personal profiles, and photo galleries into one 
easily accessible interface.”  Id. at 4.  See also Omar El Akkad, The Medium is No Longer the 
Message, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Mar. 10, 2009), http://v1.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ 
story/RTGAM.20090310.wcomputers10/BNStory/therules/News (“Blogging and social-
network sites such as Facebook and Twitter are now the fourth-most popular online 
activities, eclipsing e-mail and growing twice as fast as any other category in the top 
three.”).  The article also points out that “[i]ncreasingly, e-mail is yesterday’s messaging 
platform” and “[[w]ith social networks], you don’t just connect in static manner, you 
connect in a dynamic manner—you’re taking part in a community.”  Id.; see Jessi Hempel, 
How Facebook is Taking Over Our Lives, CNNMONEY (Mar. 11, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/ 
2009/02/16/technology/hempel_facebook.fortune/index.htm (describing Facebook 
standardized communication and the marketing platform as “ubiquitous and intuitive as 
the telephone but far more interactive”). 
17 See Janet Kornblum, Facebook Will Soon Be Available to Everyone, USA TODAY (Sept. 11, 
2006), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-09-11-facebook-everyone_x.htm 
(stating that when Facebook was first introduced in 2006, it was only available to students 
who had valid college email addresses).  “Now [Facebook] will be open to virtually 
anyone.”  Id.  See also Laura Locke, The Future of Facebook, TIME (July 17, 2007), 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1644040,00.html (illustrating the 
demographics of Facebook users).  Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg explains: 
Right now a lot of our growth is happening internationally.  We have 
more than 10% or 15% of the population of Canada on the site.  The 
U.K. has a huge user base. . . . What we’re doing is pretty broadly 
applicable to people in all different age groups and demographics and 
places around the world. 
Id. 
18 See Eric Eldon, New Facebook Statistics Show Big Increase in Content Sharing, Local 
Business Pages, INSIDE FACEBOOK (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.insidefacebook.com/ 
2010/02/15/new-facebook-statistics-show-big-increase-in-content-sharing-local-business-
pages/ (detailing Facebook features such as uploading photos, creating events and pages, 
and updating statuses); see also Aaron Ricadela, Fogeys Flock to Facebook, BUS. WK. (Aug. 6, 
2007), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/aug2007/tc2007085_051788 
.htm (“Among Silicon Valley executives, journalists, and publicists, Facebook has become 
the place to see and be seen. . . . As the site lures more professionals, it could attract more 
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Facebook had more than 750 million active users worldwide and about 
157 million active users in the United States.19  In 2011, the largest group 
of Facebook users in the United States included people between the ages 
of eighteen and twenty-five, surpassing the second and fourth largest 
groups of Facebook users, people between twenty-six and thirty-four 
and thirteen and seventeen, combined.20 
With so many individuals connected in the same social networking 
sphere, groups of people who rarely crossed paths before now have the 
opportunity to peer into each other’s lives—and teachers and students 
are no exception.21  Overlap between teachers’ and students’ Facebook 
use is evident; first-year teachers usually fall within Facebook’s largest 
group of users, people between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, and 
students usually fall within Facebook’s fourth largest group of users, 
people between the ages of thirteen and seventeen.22  As teachers and 
                                                                                                             
brand advertisers that want to aim word-of-mouth campaigns at an upscale audience,” 
such as business professionals). 
19 Kim-Mai Cutler, Zuckerberg Confirms That Facebook Has Reached 750 Million Monthly 
Actives, INSIDE FACEBOOK (July 6, 2011), http://www.insidefacebook.com/2011/07/06/ 
facebook-750-million-monthly-actives/; see Amy Lee, Facebook Users DROP in U.S.:  Millions 
Left the Social Network in May 2011, HUFFINGTON POST (June 13, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/13/facebook-users-members-us-growth-drops-
may-2011_n_875810.html (“U.S. accounts fell by close to 6 million, from 155.2 million at the 
beginning of May to 149.4 million at the end.”).  But see Jessica Van Sack, Facebook Denies 
Loss of 6 Million U.S. Users, BOS. HERALD (June 14, 2011), http://www.bostonherlad.com/ 
jobfind/news/technology/view/2011_0614facebook_denies_loss_of_6_million_us_users/ 
(reporting that Facebook directed the Boston Herald to industry-backed research, which 
said its research shows Facebook with an all-time high of 157 million U.S. visitors in May 
2011). 
20 Ken Burbary, Facebook Demographics Revisted—2011 Statistics, WEB BUS. (Mar. 7, 2011), 
http://www.kenburbary.com/2011/03/facebook-demographics-revisited-2011-statistics-
2/.  Facebook users between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five make up 35% of total 
users; ages twenty-six through thirty-four comprise 25%; and ages thirteen to seventeen 
make up 10%.  Id.  The third largest group of Facebook users, who make up 16%, are 
between the ages of thirty-five and forty-four.  Id. 
21 See Janet Kornblum & Mary Beth Marklein, What You Say Online Could Haunt You, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 8, 2006), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy/2006-03-08-
facebook-myspace_x.htm (explaining that social networking use causes groups of people to 
cross paths who would otherwise rarely interact).  In one instance, two Louisiana State 
swimmers were kicked off the swim-team for making comments about their coaches on 
Facebook.  Id.  In another case, an applicant was denied school admission partly because 
his entries on a blogging site included critical comments about the school.  Id. 
22  See Eric Benderoff, Social Sites Go Political, CHI. TRIBUNE (Sept. 23, 2007), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-sun_obama_websep23,0,4824579.story 
?page=2 (revealing new research released from Nielsen/NetRatings that “Facebook’s 
greatest concentration of new users over the last year was between the ages of 12 and 17”); 
see also Matt Richtel & Miguel Helft, Facebook Users Who Are Under Age Raise Concerns, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/12/technology/internet/ 
12underage.html?pagewanted=all (reporting that in Aundrea Kaune’s fifth-grade class at 
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students both continue to use social networking sites, students’ 
opportunity and ability to peer into the lives of their teachers has 
dramatically increased.23  As a result, many acknowledge growing 
concerns over what happens once a teacher and student become 
“friends” on Facebook.24  While most teachers use social media 
appropriately, some teachers have set poor examples by posting lurid 
comments or photographs involving sex or alcohol on social media sites; 
others have had inappropriate contact with students, which blurs or 
even crosses the teacher-student boundary.25  In response to such 
                                                                                                             
Commodore Sloat Elementary school, fifteen of the thirty students reported having 
Facebook accounts).  “‘And you should see all the third-graders who are on. . . . Last year, 
she went onto Facebook and was shocked by how many students from the school were 
there.”  Id. 
23 See Allison Manning, Be Less Social, Teachers Told, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Sept. 20, 2010), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2010/09/20/belesssocialteacherstold.ht
ml (“It used to be that the biggest peek students got into their teachers’ out-of-school life 
was bumping into them at the mall.  Now, students can log onto their computers and find 
their teachers’ public Facebook profiles, Twitter pages or personal blogs, with a little bit of 
Internet searching.”).  However, “[w]ith online profiles and communication, teachers’ 
personal lives and activities are much more easily accessed by today’s students.”  Id.  See 
also Merritt Melancon, Teacher Facebook Flap Stirs Debate, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD (Nov. 14, 
2009), http://onlineathens.com/stories/111409/new_516320164.shtml (“Facebook . . . also 
can give students unprecedented access to the private lives of their teachers.”); Peter 
Schworm, Norton Warns Teachers Not to ‘Friend’ Students, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 25, 2010), 
http://www.boston.com/news/education/k_12/articles/2010/10/25/norton_warns_teac
hers_not_to_friend_students/ (stating that forming teacher-student friendships on social 
networking sites, “gives students a broader look into teachers’ personal lives, and risks 
exposing them to adult content”). 
24 See Kathy McCabe, School Districts Consider Social Media Policy, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 22, 
2011), http://articles.boston.com/2011-09-22/yourtown/30190217_1_social-media-social-
networking-school-districts (voicing growing concerns, Lynn School Superintendent, 
Catherine Latham stated that, “[w]e need to educate our faculty, staff and the public on the 
ramifications of using social networking, and Internet sites, for any school 
communications”).  An advocate for a social media policy, Superintendent Marie Galinski 
expressed safety as a priority, stating that “[b]ased on the current climate, where students 
are on Facebook all the time, we have to make sure they are safe . . . .”  Id.  See also Jennette 
Barnes, Schools Set Rules for Social Networks, BOS. GLOBE (July 10, 2011), 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2011/07/10/schools_set_rules_for_social_n
etworks/ (“Social networking between students and staff could create the perception of 
inappropriate relationships, even where none exist, so staff members should avoid getting 
involved in students’ social world online.”).  “Schools [sic] officials say they want not only 
to protect students from predators, but also to protect teachers who have good intentions 
from getting involved in students’ lives in inappropriate ways or ways that create the 
appearance of impropriety.”  Id. 
25 See Jennifer Preston, Rules to Stop Pupil and Teacher from Getting Too Social Online, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2011), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A00E1D8103A 
F93BA25751C1A9679D8B63&ref=jenniferpreston (“In extreme cases, teachers and coaches 
have been jailed on sexual abuse and assault charges after having relationships with 
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concerns, school boards, school districts, and even legislatures are 
implementing policies restricting online teacher-student 
communication.26  However, questions arise as to whether school boards, 
school districts, and legislatures can properly and lawfully restrict 
teachers’ use of social networking sites after the school day ends.27 
To begin, Part II.A of this Note provides an overview of teachers’ 
interests in using social networking websites, as well as school boards’ 
interests in restricting teachers’ social networking use.28  Second, Part II.B 
discusses a Missouri statute, existing district-level policies, and schools’ 
acceptable use policies, all of which restrict and prohibit teachers’ social 
networking activity.29  Lastly, Part II.C examines the Supreme Court’s 
analytical framework for addressing public employees’ First 
                                                                                                             
students that, law enforcement officials say, began with electronic communication.”).  For 
example: 
In Illinois, a 56-year-old former language-arts teacher was found guilty 
in September on sexual abuse and assault charges involving a 17-year-
old female student with whom he had exchanged more than 700 text 
messages.  In Sacramento, a 37-year-old high school band director 
pleaded guilty to sexual misconduct stemming from his relationship 
with a 16-year-old female student; her Facebook page had more than 
1,200 private messages from him . . . .   In Pennsylvania, a 39-year-old 
male high school athletic director pleaded guilty . . . to charges of 
attempted corruption of a minor; he was arrested for offering a former 
male student gifts in exchange for sex. 
Id.  See also Kevin Sieff, Reading and Writing and Tweets and Clicks, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 
2011, at A01 (stating that teacher-student contact via Facebook “makes it easier for 
predators to engage in what experts call ‘sexual grooming,’ the first stages of an 
inappropriate teacher-student relationship”).  See, e.g., Cindy Martin, Can You Lose Your Job 
Over Facebook?, CASHFORCREATIONS WEBLOG (Mar. 28, 2009), http://cashforcreations. 
wordpress.com/2009/03/28/can-lou-lose-your-job-over-facebook/ (citing numerous 
examples of teachers who are currently under investigation or have been dismissed for 
their use of social networking sites). 
26 See Preston, supra note 25 (“Lewis Holloway, the superintendent of schools in 
Statesboro, Ga., imposed a new policy this fall prohibiting private electronic 
communications after learning that Facebook and text messages had helped fuel a 
relationship between an eighth grade English teacher and her 14-year-old male pupil.”).  
The teacher was arrested by authorities and charged with aggravated child molestation 
and statutory rape.  Id. 
27 Although conflicts regarding educators’ use of social networking sites predominately 
occur on Facebook and Myspace, other Internet websites such as YouTube and Twitter 
have also led to conflicts for both teachers who use the sites and school boards who wish to 
restrict teachers’ speech on social networking sites.  See generally Heather L. Carter, Teresa 
S. Foulger & Ann Dutton Ewbank, Have You Googled Your Teacher Lately?  Teachers’ Use of 
Social Networking Sites, 89 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 681, 682–83 (2008) (discussing educators’ use 
of various social networking sites). 
28 See infra Part II.A (addressing school boards’ and teachers’ competing interests 
regarding teachers’ social networking use). 
29 See infra Part II.B (discussing various restrictions on teacher-student communication 
via social networking sites). 
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Amendment rights, which currently applies to cases involving teachers’ 
speech via social networking sites.30 
A. Understanding the Interests:  Teachers vs. School Boards 
Like most adults in the workplace, teachers have personal lives 
outside of their careers.31  Whether social networking entails engaging 
with fellow colleagues outside the classroom, re-connecting with old 
friends from college, or simply sharing private information, such as a 
thought or feeling, teachers have a legitimate, personal interest in online 
social networking use.32  Most notably, teachers, as private citizens, have 
a First Amendment interest in expressing themselves regardless of 
whether it is through a column in the newspaper or through a post on 
Facebook.33  Additionally, distinct from teachers’ First Amendment 
                                                 
30 See infra Part II.C (examining the Supreme Court’s analytical framework applied in 
public employees’ First Amendment free speech claims). 
31 See Todd A. DeMitchell, Commentary, Private Lives:  Community Control vs. Professional 
Autonomy, 78 ED. LAW REP. 187, 188 (1993) (“[T]he private acts of a teacher were considered 
just that, private, unless it could be shown that those acts damaged his or her ability to 
perform the job.”).  “The control and degree of pressure that the community brought” upon 
teachers was both imposing and shocking.  Id. at 191.  “Such activities as dancing, smoking, 
drinking, divorce, marriage, dating and pregnancy were looked at askance by school 
authorities and frequently any indulgence in these activities resulted in disciplinary 
action.”  Id.  See also Laura Sofen, Why Can’t We Be (Digital) Friends, TEACHING TOLERANCE 
(Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.tolerance.org/blog/why-can-t-we-be-digital-friends (“Some 
would argue that teachers are simply not entitled to the same level of privacy as other 
citizens because [they are] influencing youth all day and thus a higher standard of behavior 
is expected. . . . [[T]eachers] are private citizens who live private lives outside of school.”). 
32 See Michelle A. Todd, John L. DiJon & Shayne L. Aldridge, Employee Use, Misuse, and 
Abuse of Social Network Sites, NAT’L SCH. BOARDS ASS’N (Feb. 26, 2008), 
http://www.vineland.org/tech/socialnet.pdf (discussing the different ways in which 
teachers use social networking sites). 
Teachers utilize blogs and social networking sites for varying 
purposes.  Some educators have embraced blogs as a way to engage 
colleagues, administrators, students, and parents in thoughtful 
educational discourse.  Others have used their blogs as a forum to rant 
about colleagues, administrators, students, and parents.  Still others 
use social networking sites to interact with others on topics of mutual 
interest that are wholly unrelated to their employment as teachers. 
Id. 
33 See Rachel A. Miller, Teacher Facebook Speech:  Protected or Not?, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 
637, 658–59 (2011) (discussing teachers’ online, private, off-the-job, speech).  “Teachers used 
to hold [] conversations with their friends and relatives through the telephone, letters, and 
e-mail.  With the mainstreaming of social media, personal conversations have become more 
public and the law has to answer whether it will allow school districts to curb this sort of 
teacher speech.”  Id.  See also Ewan McIntosh, Teachers and Facebook:  Please, Miss, Can I 
Friend You On Facebook?, EDU.BLOGS.COM (Feb. 15, 2011), http://edu.blogs.com/ 
edublogs/2011/02/teachers-and-facebook-please-miss-can-i-friend-you-on-facebook.html 
(“No employer has the right to tell a member of staff [sic] that they cannot interact on social 
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interest in expressing their personal opinions, teachers also have a First 
Amendment interest in communicating with their students through 
technology as a teaching tool for conveying their instructional methods.34 
1. Teachers’ Interest in Free Expression and Academic Freedom 
The Supreme Court has recognized some First Amendment 
protection within the classroom for teachers’ academic or instructional 
speech.35  Teachers’ academic freedom includes a substantive right to 
express or choose a teaching method that serves an educational 
purpose.36  Because teachers are in direct, day-to-day contact with 
students both in the classroom and other activities, such as after-school 
programs, teachers, by necessity, have wide discretion over the manner 
in which the course material is communicated to students.37  The court in 
Cockrel v. Shelby County School District recognized this principle of 
                                                                                                             
networks or publish their work and thoughts freely on the web—this is the right to express 
oneself, a fundamental [right], if ever there was one.”). 
34 See infra Part II.A (describing teachers’ academic freedom and instructional speech via 
social media). 
35 See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our 
Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent 
value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.  That freedom is therefore a 
special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom.”); see also Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (D. 
Mass. 1971) (“[A] public school teacher has not only a civic right to freedom of speech both 
outside . . . and inside . . . the schoolhouse, but also some measure of academic freedom as 
to his in-classroom teaching.”).  However, it is important to note that both cases involved 
college and university professors. 
36  See, e.g., Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763 F.2d 211, 215 (6th Cir. 1985) (recognizing that a 
teacher’s First Amendment rights encompass the notion of academic freedom to exercise 
professional judgment in selecting topics and materials for use in the course of the 
educational process).  See generally Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 
1113 (5th Cir. 1980); Cary v. Bd. of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 539–41 (10th Cir. 1979); Keefe v. 
Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 362 (1st Cir. 1969); Dean v. Timpson Indep. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 
302, 307 (E.D. Tex. 1979). 
37 See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78–79 (1979) (noting the important role teachers 
play within the public school system in developing students’ attitudes).  The court held: 
[Teachers] are responsible for presenting and explaining the subject 
matter in a way that is both comprehensible and inspiring.  No 
amount of standardization of teaching materials or lesson plans can 
eliminate the personal qualities a teacher brings to bear in achieving 
these goals.  Further, a teacher serves as a role model for his students, 
exerting a subtle but important influence over their perceptions and 
values.  Thus, through both the presentation of course materials and 
the example he sets, a teacher has an opportunity to influence the 
attitudes of students toward government, the political process, and a 
citizen’s social responsibilities.  This influence is crucial to the 
continued good health of a democracy. 
Id.  
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academic freedom when 5th grade teacher, Donna Cockrel, filed a suit, 
claiming First Amendment protection after being terminated for inviting 
actor Woody Harrelson into her classroom to talk to students about 
marijuana and industrial hemp.38  The court not only held that a 
teacher’s decision to present these speakers to the class itself constitutes 
an act of speech or expression, but that a teacher’s very decision to 
present materials to a class also constitutes “speech,” even if the teacher 
has no “advocative purpose” in doing so.39 
Teachers’ freedom to convey their instructional methods through 
technological communications such as Blackboard, web pages, and 
school blogs, has opened the door for teachers’ use of social media, 
which has become an increasingly effective classroom tool for teaching 
and learning.40  Teachers have expanded classroom participation by 
                                                 
38 Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1041–42 (6th Cir. 2001).  Mr. 
Harrelson had prior official approval by school administration for the visit and brought 
along an “entourage, including representatives of the Kentucky Hemp Museum and 
Kentucky Hemp Growers Cooperative Association, several hemp growers from foreign 
countries, CNN, and various Kentucky news media representatives.”  Id. at 1042 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The actor “spoke with the children about his opposition to 
marijuana use, yet he distinguished marijuana from industrial hemp and advocated the use 
of industrial hemp as an alternative to increased logging efforts.”  Id.  He also showed the 
class products made from hemp and hemp seeds, a banned substance in Kentucky.  Id. at 
1042–43.  Ms. Cockrel was terminated for deficient “communication with parents regarding 
student performance and teacher expectations; documentation of lesson plans; showing 
‘consistent sensitivity to individual academic, physical, social, and cultural differences and 
respond[ing] to all students in a caring manner’ [and] acting in accordance with laws and 
with school regulations and procedures.”  Id. at 1045. 
39 Id. at 1049.  The court ultimately rejects Judge Milburn’s analysis in Fowler v. Bd. of 
Educ., 819 F.2d 657, 662 (6th Cir. 1987).  In Fowler, a high school teacher, at the request of 
her students, showed them Pink Floyd—The Wall, an “R” rated film containing nudity and a 
great deal of violence, on the last day of school while she completed grade cards.  Id. at 
658–59.  After the teacher was later terminated for showing the film, she brought suit, 
claiming that she was terminated in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights.  
Id.   Judge Milburn argued that a teacher’s decision to present materials to a class cannot be 
considered expression unless the teacher intended to convey a particular message.  Id. at 
662–64. 
40 See What is Blackboard?, BOISE STATE UNIV., http://at.boisestate.edu/elearning/ 
blackboard/BbDocs/general/whatisblackboard.asp (last visited on Aug. 2, 2012) 
(“Blackboard is a Web-based course-management system designed to allow students and 
faculty to participate in classes delivered online or use online materials and activities to 
complement face-to-face teaching.  Blackboard enables instructors to provide students with 
course materials, discussion boards, virtual chat, online quizzes, an academic resource 
center, and more.”); see also Caroline Lego Munoz, Opening Facebook:  How to Use Facebook in 
the College Classroom (2009), http://www46.homepage.villanova.edu/john.immerwahr/ 
TP101/Facebook.pdf (discussing the benefits of using Facebook as an educational tool for 
both students and teachers).  Facebook helps teachers connect with their students about 
assignments, useful links, upcoming events, and samples of work outside the classroom.  
Id. at 5.  Not only can students use Facebook to contact other students regarding 
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effectively reaching students through their most commonly exercised 
social medium, and many teachers find that online social networking 
sites provide an open and supportive environment for teacher-student 
interaction.41  For example, Facebook features include bulletin boards, 
instant messaging, email, and the ability to post videos and pictures.42  
Facebook also has downloadable features, such as applications, which 
may have superior quality of use compared to similar courseware 
options, such as Blackboard, and without the cost.43  Facebook not only 
connects students with other students by indirectly creating a learning 
                                                                                                             
assignments or exams, but Facebook also allows student collaboration for group 
assignments and projects in an online environment.  Id.  Facebook simply sets up a 
platform for students’ courses atop the community already established by the students 
themselves.  Id.;  Social Networking In Schools:  Educators Debate The Merits Of Technology In 
Classrooms, HUFFINGTON POST (May 27, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/ 
27/social-networking-schools_n_840911.html (describing the positive affects social 
networking sites have on students and the essential tools they provide for education in 
today’s digital climate).  “Through utilizing teaching techniques that incorporate social 
media, teachers are able to increase students’ engagement in their education, increase 
technological proficiency, contribute to a greater sense of collaboration in the classroom, 
and build better communication skills.”  Id. 
41 See Munoz, supra note 40 (discussing the benefits of using Facebook as an means of 
building teacher-student relationships).  For example, teacher-student relationships on 
social networks “allow students to glimpse instructor profiles containing personal 
information, interests, background, and ‘friends,’ which can enhance student motivation, 
affective learning, and classroom climate.”  Id. at 5. 
42 See Jeffrey Weiss, As Budgets Get Stretched, Schools Turn to Free Digital Tools, DALL. 
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 6, 2001, § 5, at 4 (discussing cheap or free high-quality education 
tools).  “Teachers and school districts are turning online for teaching games, collaborative 
tools and even custom-made entire textbooks.”  Id.  See also Brian Jenkins, Awesome Facebook 
Apps for Educators, TEACH HUB.COM, http://www.teachhub.com/awesome-facebook-apps-
educators (last visited Jan. 15, 2012) (describing some of Facebook’s educational 
applications).  Some of Facebook’s educational applications include:  study groups, 
collaboration with “group projects, shar[ing] notes, discuss[ing] assignments, and help[ing] 
students prepare for tests.”  Id.  Other educational applications include “SAT Quest,” 
“Quizlet,” and “GRE/GMAT Vocabulary Flashcards,” all designed to help students 
prepare for the standardized exams.  Id.  Additionally, the “To Do List” and “Zoho Online 
Office” applications help students manage and organize assignments, class presentations, 
and other documents online. 
43 See Michelle R. Davis, Social Networking Goes to School, EDU. WK. (June 14, 2010), 
http://www.edweek.org/dd/articles/2010/06/16/03networking.h03.html (reporting a 
comment from a New Jersey principal who stated, “I’m just someone who is passionate 
about engaging students and growing professionally, and I’m using these free tools to do 
it”); see also Claire Smith, Benefits of Facebook Application Development For Educational 
Institutes, SOOPERARTICLES.COM (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.sooperarticles.com/internet-
articles/social-networking-articles/benefits-facebook-application-development-
educational-institutes-216392.html (“[A]pplications [on Facebook] can be targeted to fulfill 
students[’] needs along with teachers and the institute.  This serves as one in all packages 
and gives a very cheap solution for education institutes to correspond with other 
institutions and with learners and lecturers of organizations.”). 
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community by which students can help and support one another, but it 
also builds teacher-student relationships.44 
2. School Boards’ Interest in Restricting Teachers’ Social Networking 
Speech 
With the growth and advancement of social networking use, 
boundary lines between what is considered appropriate teacher-student 
communication and what is inappropriate have become blurred.45  The 
school district, both as employer and educator, has an important interest 
in its employees’ conduct that potentially interferes with their mission to 
provide, as well as maintain, a healthy environment conducive to 
student learning.46  This overarching interest encompasses not only 
employing highly qualified teachers but also holding teachers to a higher 
moral standard.47  Because teachers serve as role models to the students, 
                                                 
44 See Lisa Nielsen, 10 Ways Facebook Strengthens the Student-Teacher Connection, 
INNOVATIVE EDUCATOR BLOG (Feb. 3. 2011), http://theinnovativeeducator. 
blogspot.com/2011/02/10-ways-students-feel-facebook.html (suggesting that Facebook 
can be an effective tool in strengthening the teacher-student bond). 
Students shared that sometimes it’s hard for them to approach a 
teacher or even really reach out for help face-to-face.  Sharing a 
disappointment on Facebook can be easier.  Students shared how 
touched they were by encouraging words from a teacher either on 
their page, or as a face-to-face follow up. 
Id.  The students also explained how the use of Facebook has helped strengthen their 
connections with teachers and their principal and that they did not “‘expect’ their teachers 
to be friends with them on Facebook, but appreciate it when they do.”  Id. 
45 See Lynn Moore, Teachers’ Facebook Pages Face Scrutiny in Reeths-Puffer, MLIVE.COM 
(Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.mlive.com/news/muskegon/index.ssf/2011/03/teachers_ 
facebook_pages_face_s.html (“Social media tends to blur some of those lines that are 
necessary to keep and maintain professional relationships [among teachers and 
students.]”). 
46 See Monica D. Hutchinson, What You Know About and Don’t Deal with Can Cost You:  A 
School District's Potential Liability for Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment, 65 MO. L. REV. 
493, 502 (2000) (discussing school districts’ liability for matters that harm both students and 
their education environment, such as teacher-on-student sexual harassment).  However, 
some courts have argued that a school district could only be held liable for damages under 
Title IX where the school district had actual knowledge of the teacher-on-student 
harassment and was deliberately indifferent to the harassment.  Id.  See also Cape Henlopen 
School District Board Policy, at 323, http://teachers.cape.k12.de.us/~ritter/boardpolicy.pdf 
(discussing a school district’s responsibilities, which include electing all 
employees/teachers through the school board). 
47 See Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Payne, 430 N.E.2d 310, 315 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“We are aware 
of the special position occupied by a teacher in our society.  As a consequence of that 
elevated stature, a teacher’s actions are subject to much greater scrutiny than that given to 
the activities of the average person.”); Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952), 
overruled in part by Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (“A teacher works in a 
sensitive area in a schoolroom.  There he shapes the attitude of young minds towards the 
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schools have a legitimate interest in preventing inappropriate teacher 
activities, regardless of whether the inappropriate conduct occurs inside 
or outside the classroom.48  Consequently, in an attempt to set 
boundaries for appropriate online teacher-student communication, 
school boards, through enactments of broad ranges of rules and 
regulations, began outlining conduct for both their students and their 
employees.49 
B. Means for Restricting Teachers’ Use of Social Networking Sites 
A school board’s chief responsibility is to protect as well as maintain 
the professional rapport between teachers and students.50  Because 
schools have legitimate interests in maintaining the boundary lines 
between teachers and students, schools across the country, including the 
Missouri state legislature, have addressed these issues in several ways.51  
A common course of action that many school districts take to limit a 
teacher’s ability to access social networking sites is through disciplinary 
procedures.52 
                                                                                                             
society in which they live.  In this, the state has a vital concern.”); Horosko v. Sch. Dist. of 
Mount Pleasant Twp., 6 A.2d 866, 868 (Pa. 1939) (“It has always been the recognized duty 
of the teacher to conduct himself in such a way as to command the respect and good will of 
the community . . . . ”).  See also Marka B. Fleming, Amanda Harmon Cooley & Gwendolyn 
McFadden-Wade, Morals Clauses for Educators in Secondary and Postsecondary Schools:  Legal 
Applications and Constitutional Concerns, 2009 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 67, 102 (2009) (discussing 
and examining the influence of postsecondary school teachers and their positions as role 
models).  Specifically, the author addresses the legal applications of statutory provisions 
for secondary and postsecondary school teachers, including the implications of contractual 
morality clauses for secondary and postsecondary school teachers.  Id. at 69. 
48 See Preston, supra note 25 (describing various inappropriate teacher-student 
relationships stemming from social networking use); see also Perry Chiaramonte & Yoav 
Gonen, Teachers Fired for Flirting on Facebook with Students, N.Y. POST (Oct. 18, 2010), 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/teachers_friending_spree_JVfEO8TmN7XCnWp
X5s5hnO (providing numerous examples of inappropriate teacher conduct stemming from 
communication with students via messaging on Facebook). 
49 See generally What Does the School Board Do?, NEV. ASS’N OF SCH. BDS., 
http://www.nvasb.org/Publications/Goverance/What%20Does%20the%20School%20Boa
rd%20Do.pdf (last visited Jan 4, 2012) (describing school boards’ responsibilities, such as 
policy making and evaluation). 
50 See Professional Responsibilities, NSW DEPT. OF EDUC. AND CMTYS., 
https://www.det.nsw.edu.au/about-us/careers-centre/school-careers/teaching/your-
teaching-career/approved-teachers/casual-teacher-induction/professional-responsibilities 
(last visited Jan. 4, 2012), (outlining the professional boundaries between teachers and 
students).  Teacher-student relationships involve “develop[ing] a relationship with clear 
professional boundaries that cannot be misinterpreted as a personal, rather than a 
professional, interest in the student[.]”  Id. 
51 See infra Part II.B (detailing current measures for prohibiting teachers’ social 
networking use). 
52 See Part II.B (discussing disciplinary actions taken against teachers). 
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Virtually every state has an administrative code section for 
education, which includes professional standards and guidelines for 
how teachers should act within the teaching profession.53  For example, 
grounds for disciplinary actions against teachers most commonly include 
incompetence, negligence of duty, substantial noncompliance with 
school laws, insubordination, and immoral conduct.54  A teacher’s ability 
to know and understand just what conduct is prohibited in regards to 
their teaching is an important aspect of such disciplinary actions. 55  Yet 
school administrators admit that new technologies create a gray area as 
to what online conduct or speech merits such disciplinary actions.56  In 
addition to disciplinary actions, teachers’ online social networking use 
may also be curbed through other means—including a state statute.57 
                                                 
53 See 22 PA. CODE § 235.2 (2011) (“Violations of the Code may also be used as 
supporting evidence, though may not constitute an independent basis, for the suspension 
or revocation of a [teaching] certificate.”).  See generally 23 ILL. ADM. CODE § 24.100 (2000) 
(describing various professional teaching standards that educators must abide by to receive 
teaching certification). 
54 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44434 (West 1999) (recognizing immorality as a grounds for 
teacher dismissal).  See generally ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 14.20.170(2) (West 1999); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 20-2-940(a)(4) (West 2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 168.114(2) (West 1999); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 49-5-501 (West 1999); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18A-2-8 (West 2000). 
55 See Thompson v. Sw. Sch. Dist., 483 F. Supp. 1170, 1178 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (“[O]ur 
judicial system has always insisted that laws give persons of ordinary intelligence an 
opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited so that they will have an opportunity to 
avoid that type of conduct.”).  The court agreed that, in the abstract, the phrase “immoral 
conduct” was constitutionally suspect under the strict standards of construction to be 
employed in criminal and First Amendment contexts.  Id. at 1179.  The court went on to 
say, however, that the phrase was part of a statutory scheme that, construed with the other 
subsections of the statute, is “capable of being given a more precise judicial construction so 
as to avoid the vagueness issue.”  Id. at 1180.  The court concluded that immoral conduct 
relates to conduct rendering a teacher unfit for the performance of his duties.  Id.  More 
precisely, the court found that immoral conduct means “conduct rendering plaintiff unfit 
to teach.”  Id. at 1181.  See also Alford v. Ingram, 931 F. Supp. 768, 771 (M.D. Ala. 1996) 
(upholding the constitutionality of a statute permitting a teacher’s termination for 
“immoral conduct”).  The court held that although the statute was plagued with 
vagueness, it did imply an unfitness to teach.  Id. 
56 See Melancon, supra note 23 (“It’s a clear violation if a teacher invites students to join 
his Facebook friends and has inappropriate material on his page. . . . If a teacher posts nude 
pictures somewhere where students can find them, that’s probably a violation too.”).  
However, school administrators acknowledge that “if someone complains because there’s a 
photo of (a teacher) with a glass of wine or because of the clothes they’re wearing—well, 
there’s a whole lot of gray area there[.]”  Id. 
57 See Ned Potter, Missouri Teachers Protest ‘Facebook Law’ Meant to Protect Students From 
Sexual Predators, ABC NEWS (Aug. 24, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/missouri-
facebook-law-bans-teachers-contacting-students-internet/story?id=14364188#.TrQ-
MXJLM3E (stating that the law was “meant to protect children from sexual predators at 
school”); Jane Cunningham, Senator Cunningham’s “Amy Hestir Student Protection Act” 
Signed by Governor, SENATE.MO.GOV, http://www.senate.mo.gov/media/11info/ 
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Missouri is currently the only state to prohibit social networking 
communication between teachers and students through a statute.58  On 
May 12, 2011, the Missouri General Assembly passed a bill prohibiting 
teachers from using non-work related websites to gain “exclusive access” 
to current or former students who are under the age 18 and who have 
not yet graduated.59  The statute was to take effect beginning on August 
                                                                                                             
Cunningham/releases/SB54Signed071411.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (promoting her 
proposed bill). 
This legislation is vital to protect our children from sexual predators in 
our schools—places meant as safe learning environments.  Aside from 
mandatory extensive background checks, my bill will make it possible 
for school officials to be aware of sexual misconduct exhibited by 
potential hires and their employees when making staffing decisions.  
This will serve as an invaluable tool for protecting our children. 
Id. (internal quotes omitted). 
58 See Anita Ramasastry, Can Teachers and Their Students Be Banned from Becoming Facebook 
Friends?  The Missouri Legislature Says Yes, But a Missouri Court Suggests the Answer Is No, 
JUSTIA.COM (Sept. 13, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/09/13/can-teachers-and-their-
students-be-banned-from-becoming-facebook-friends (providing that Senate Bill 54’s 
sponsor, Senator Cunningham “argued that all she wanted to do was to limit ‘hidden 
communications’ between teachers and students, which could not be monitored readily by 
parents or school administrators”); see also Kayla Webley, Missouri Law:  Teachers and 
Students Can’t Be Facebook Friends, TIME.COM (Aug. 1, 2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/ 
2011/08/01/in-missouri-teachers-and-students-legally-cant-be-facebook-friends/ (“With 
[the] new law, Missouri has became [sic] the first in the nation to prohibit social 
networking [between students and teachers].”). 
59 S. 54, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011), http://www.senate.mo.gov/ 
11info/pdf-bill/intro/SB54.pdf.  Senate Bill 54, also known as the Amy Hestir Student 
Protection Act, was sponsored by Senator Jane Cunningham and signed into law by 
Missouri Governor, Jay Nixon.  Id.  Section 162.069 of Senate Bill 54 provides: 
1. Every school district shall, by January 1, 2012, promulgate a 
written policy concerning teacher-student communication and 
employee-student communication.  Such policy shall contain at least 
the following elements: 
(1) Appropriate oral and nonverbal personal communication, 
which may be combined with or included in any policy on sexual 
harassment; and 
(2) Appropriate use of electronic media such as text messaging 
and internet sites for both instructional and personal purposes, 
with an element concerning use of social networking sites no less 
stringent than the provisions of subsections 2, 3, and 4 of this 
section. 
2. As used in this section, the following terms shall mean: 
(1) “Exclusive access”, the information on the website is available 
only to the owner (teacher) and user (student) by mutual explicit 
consent and where third parties have no access to the information 
on the website absent an explicit consent agreement with the 
owner (teacher); 
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28, 2011, but faced opposition from a petition for injunctive relief 
initiated by the Missouri State Teachers Association.60  The Cole County 
                                                                                                             
(2) “Former student”, any person who was at one time a student 
at the school at which the teacher is employed and who is 
eighteen years of age or less and who has not graduated; 
(3) “Nonwork-related internet site”, any internet website or web 
page used by a teacher primarily for personal purposes and not 
for educational purposes; 
(4) “Work-related internet site”, any internet website or web 
pages used by a teacher for educational purposes. 
3. No teacher shall establish, maintain, or use a work-related 
internet site unless such site is available to school administrators and 
the child’s legal custodian, physical custodian, or legal guardian. 
4. No teacher shall establish, maintain, or use a nonwork-related 
internet site which allows exclusive access with a current or former 
student.  Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as prohibiting a 
teacher from establishing a nonwork related internet site, provided the 
site is used in accordance with this section. 
5. Every school district shall, by July 1, 2012, include in its teacher 
and employee training, a component that provides up-to-date and 
reliable information on identifying signs of sexual abuse in children 
and danger signals of potentially abusive relationships between 
children and adults.  The training shall emphasize the importance of 
mandatory reporting of abuse under section 210.115 including the 
obligation of mandated reporters to report suspected abuse by other 
mandated reporters, and how to establish an atmosphere of trust so 
that students feel their school has concerned adults with whom they 
feel comfortable discussing matters related to abuse. 
Id. 
60 Petition for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Judgment at 1, Missouri State Teachers 
Ass’n v. Missouri., Civ. No. 11AC-CC00553 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Aug. 19, 2011), 
http://www.msta.org/news/Petition_final.pdf.  The Missouri Teachers Association raised 
the following contentions: 
12. Section 160.069 makes it unlawful for school teachers to 
communicate with their children, relatives, church youth group 
members, and even news paper reporters who happen to be current or 
former students using Facebook-type web sites or by many of the other 
popular and increasingly indispensable computer and cell phone 
based technologies in wide-spread use in society today [to 
communicate with students using non-work-related social media 
regarding religious activities]. 
. . . . 
14.  The Act is so vague and overbroad that the Plaintiffs cannot 
know with confidence what conduct is permitted and what is 
prohibited . . . . 
. . . . 
19(a). The Act violates Plaintiffs’ freedom of speech, which is 
guaranteed under the Missouri Constitution, Article I, Section 8, and 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because it is a 
prior restraint on a form of expression included within the free speech 
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Circuit Court granted the request for a preliminary injunction, finding 
that “the statute would have a chilling effect on speech.”61  Shortly 
thereafter, the Missouri Governor called upon Missouri lawmakers to 
repeal the law in a special legislative session.62  On September 23, 2011,  
Missouri lawmakers repealed the statute and required public school 
districts to adopt policies on employee-student communications, 
including “the use of electronic media . . . to prevent improper 
communications” by March 1, 2012.63  The aftermath surrounding 
Missouri’s controversial statute lead many school districts to implement 
their own district-level policies.64 
Many school districts across the United States, following in the 
footsteps of the Missouri legislature, began implementing their own 
district-level policies addressing online teacher-student 
communications.65  In Wisconsin, the Elmbrook School District’s policy 
                                                                                                             
guarantees of the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States 
Constitution. 
. . . . 
20(a). The Act would ban and make unlawful communications via 
non-work-related websites and other social networking sites between 
parents who are teachers and their children who are students. 
. . . .  
21(b). The Act violates Plaintiffs’ and other teachers’ freedom of 
association because it is facially coercive in derogation of Plaintiff’s 
First Amendment rights. 
Id. at 3–6. 
61 Order Entering Preliminary Injunction at 2, Missouri State Teachers Ass’n v. Missouri, 
Civ. No. 11ACC-CC00553 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.msta.org/files/ 
resources/publications/injunction.pdf.  The court recognized that the statute “clearly 
prohibits communication between family members and their teacher parents using these 
type of sites[]” and,  if permitted, would constitute an “immediate and irreparable harm.”  
Id.  The court also stated that it was required to “balance the individual rights of the 
Plaintiffs against the public interest.”  Id. at 3.  In doing so, the court found that the “public 
interest is best served by allowing a trial and ruling on the merits before the statute is 
implemented.”  Id. 
62 See David A. Lieb, Facebook Law Limiting Missouri Teachers Friending Students Gets 
Repealed, Goes to Governor, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 23, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/23/facebook-law-limiting-mis_n_978200.html? 
view=print&comm_ref=false (reporting Governor Jay Nixon’s reaction to Missouri’s law).  
The Missouri Governor narrowly worded his written message to Missouri lawmakers by 
limiting them to only repealing the law.  Id. 
63 Id.  The Missouri House passed the legislation to repeal and replaced the law by a 139-
2 vote.  Id.  The Missouri Senate passed it by a 33-0 vote.  Id. 
64 See Part II.B (describing district-level policies restricting online teacher-student 
communication). 
65 See, e.g., School District of Elmbrook, Appropriate Use of Technology-Policy 4511, 
http://www.elmbrookschools.org/elmbrook-school-district/board/district-policies/4000-
human-resources/appropriate-use-of-technology-policy-4511.html (2011) [hereinafter 
School District of Elmbrook]; see also Tim Barker, Backlash Over Missouri’s Teacher ‘Facebook 
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states that “[p]ersonal communication via non-District sponsored 
applications/devices between staff and students, including, but not 
limited to, the use of social networking sites and instant messaging” is 
prohibited.66  The policy further states that the consequences for 
violating the Elmbrook policy include “termination and/or legal action, 
if warranted.”67 
Similarly, in Ohio, the Dayton Public School District’s newly enacted 
policy prohibits teachers from “friending” students via online social 
networking sites in order “[t]o maintain a more formal staff-student 
                                                                                                             
Law’, SLTTODAY.COM (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/ 
article_048b2b2f-04b4-576f-b878-b8080800e94e.html (arguing that school districts are 
recommending that teachers refrain from using social networking sites, in addition to 
deleting and refusing to communicate with students online); Michael Walsh, Tolland School 
Board to Review Social Media Policy for District Employees, HARTFORD COURANT (Sept. 26, 
2011), http://articles.courant.com/2011-09-26/community/hc-tolland-social-media-policy-
0927-20110926_1_social-media-social-networking-employees (describing a Holland, 
Connecticut, school board policy designed to prevent inappropriate teacher use of social 
networking sites).  The policy states “it is not appropriate for a teacher or administrator to 
‘friend’ a student or his/her parent or guardian . . . through social media.”  Id.  (internal 
quotations omitted).  The proposed “policy does allow employees to use social media as an 
educational tool, but asks that permission be obtained before implementation and that the 
employee follow a number of guidelines.”  Id.  However, “[p]unishment could go as far as 
termination of employment” for any violations.  Id. 
66 School District of Elmbrook, supra note 65; see also Stephanie Horvath, Teachers Get 
Tough Lesson:  Go Private on Facebook Pages, SUN-SENTINEL (June 1, 2008), http://articles.sun-
sentinel.com/2008-06-01/news/0805310363_1_teacher-s-certification-facebook-page 
(“Concerns about social networking sites led the Ohio Education Association to 
recommend last year that its members avoid MySpace and Facebook altogether.”).  
However, some school districts in Palm Beach and Broward counties in Florida have no 
policies on online content.  Id.  Nonetheless, state education officials report that they could 
still “yank a teacher’s certification if his or her online content violated the state ethics 
code.”  Id. 
67 School District of Elmbrook, supra note 65.  The policy provides staff with access to 
information technology and communication resources to accomplish its mission of 
teaching, learning, and public service operations.  Id.  However, such uses shall be related 
to educational programs or operations of the District.  Id.  See also Nancy Gier, Dist. 203 
Looks at Rules for Social Media in the Classroom, TRIBLOCAL (Oct. 5, 2010), 
http://triblocal.com/naperville/2010/10/05/dist-203-looks-at-rules-for-social-media-in-
the-classroom/ (discussing a Naperville School Board’s proposed policy that covers topics 
such as the use of cell phones, texting, Twitter, blogging, and Facebook accounts for 
academic purposes).  “Key among the guidelines is prohibiting staff members from 
becoming ‘friends’ with students on Facebook for non-academic purposes, and prohibiting 
staff members from using texts rather than voice to communicate with students via cell 
phones.”  Id.  According to policy, “texting can be easily misinterpreted.”  Id.  However, the 
current policy permits employees to use district e-mail to contact students, and students 
may carry cell phones to campus but must turn them off during school hours.  Id.  “It’s a 
huge issue for districts all across the state,” the interim director of communications said.  
Id.  “We want to set clear expectations for the use of technology in the classroom.  We’ll use 
whatever time is necessary to get the best policy.”  Id. 
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relationship.”68  Furthermore, the policy states that any violations will 
result in staff or student discipline.69 
In Manatee County, Florida, the teachers union, the Manatee 
Education Association, filed suit, challenging the constitutionality of a 
proposed Manatee School District policy prohibiting teachers from 
posting negative statements or photos about the district, employees, or 
students from their home or work computers on social networking 
sites.70  Similar to other district-level policies, Manatee School District’s 
                                                 
68 Dayton Public Schools Policy Manual, http://www.dps.k12.oh.us/documents/ 
contentdocuments/doc_23_5_1418.pdf (updated Nov. 30, 2010).  The policy provides that: 
[D]istrict employees shall not “friend” current students on social 
networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace (except when that 
employee is a relative or legal guardian of the student).  In addition, 
district employees will not “instant message” or text message current 
students, and will not respond to student-initiated attempts at 
conversation through non-district-approved media, whether 
personal or professional accounts. 
Id. at 274.  Additionally, the policy includes a specific section concerning social networking 
websites.  This subsection provides: 
1. District staff who personally participate in social networking web 
sites are prohibited from posting data, documents, photographs or 
inappropriate information on any website that might result in a 
disruption of classroom, school or district activity.  The 
Superintendent/designee has full discretion in determining when a 
disruption of classroom, school or district activity has occurred. 
2. District staff is prohibited from providing personal social 
networking web site passwords to students.  
3. Fraternization between District staff and students via the Internet, 
personal e-mail accounts, personal social networking websites and 
other modes of virtual technology is also prohibited. 
4.  Unauthorized access of personal social networking web sites 
during school hours is prohibited. 
Id. at 379–80. 
69 Id. at 380; see Sylvia Lim, School Boards:  No Tweets, Friending, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
June 19, 2011, at A1 (stating that Manatee School Board members stopped working on 
policies limiting how teachers use social media after teachers’ unions threatened legal 
action).  During a last-minute addition to the policy at the School Board’s meeting, teachers 
will be allowed to use their personal cell phones to contact students in cases such as field 
trips.  Id.  Board members raised the possibility of teachers facing an unwarranted penalty 
for using personal phones to contact students and that “[s]ometimes, the teacher is 
responsible for students off school property.”  Id. 
70 Richard Dymond, Teachers Sue Over Florida District’s Facebook Policy, BRADENTON 
HERALD (Nov. 13, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/11/13/103700/teachers-
sue-over-florida-districts.html.  “The policy would also require teachers to get written 
permission from parents if they want to communicate with students on those websites, or 
by personal e-mail.”  Id.  See Petition to Invalidate Proposed Rule at 10, Manatee Educ. 
Ass’n v. Sch. Dist. of Manatee Cnty. (Fla. Div. of Administrative Hearings, Oct. 19, 2010), 
No. 10-9760RP, http://www.doah.state.fl.us/docdoc/2010/009760/10009760M-101910-
12273827.PDF.  The policy provides in pertinent part: 
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policy also emphasized that violations were subject to employee 
discipline.71  In addition to district-level policies, schools have also 
created and implemented acceptable use policies prohibiting teachers’ 
social networking use.72 
                                                                                                             
g. “Employees are to refrain from electrically posting in publically 
accessible websites any statements, documents, or photographs that 
might cast the employee, the students, or the District in a negative, 
scandalous, or embarrassing light,” 
h. “Any inappropriate statements, documents, or photographs viewed 
by the public reflects poorly on the District as a whole and can 
negatively impact the school setting and subject the employee to 
discipline. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
71 Manatee Educ. Ass’n, supra note 70, at 11.  The Manatee Education Association 
challenged the constitutionality of the proposed policy for the following reasons:  (1) the 
policy granted the District unbridled discretion in disciplining employees, regardless of the 
severity of the conduct; (2) it violated a Florida statute by determining appropriate 
discipline without collective bargaining, which is required by law; (3) it disciplined 
employees for engaging in aspects of their private lives protected by the Florida 
Constitution (“Right of Privacy”); and (4) the policy disciplined employees for exercising 
speech on matters of public concern.  Id. at 7, 11. 
72 See FINALSITE, Social Media Acceptable Use Policies, http://www.finalsite.com/file.cfm? 
resourceid=388&filename=Social%20Media%20Acceptable%20Usage%20Policies.pdf. (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2012) (providing examples of various schools’ acceptable use policies 
concerning teachers’ use of social media tools).  For example, Castilleja School’s acceptable 
use policy provides: 
The following are guidelines for school employees who use online 
social networking applications which may be frequented by current or 
former students: 
1. COURSE USE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING:  In order to provide 
equal, age-appropriate access for students to course materials, faculty 
should limit class activities to school-sanctioned online tools.  New 
social networking tools and features are being continually introduced 
which may or may not be appropriate for course use.  The same care 
must be taken in choosing such tools as other tools and support 
materials. 
2. MODEL APPROPRIATE BEHAVIOR:  Exercise appropriate 
discretion when using social networks for personal communications 
(friends, colleagues, parents, former students, etc.) with the knowledge 
that adult behavior on social networks may be used as a model by our 
students. 
3. FRIENDING ALUMNI:  Accept social network friend requests 
only with alumni over the age of 18.  Do not initiate friend contacts 
with alumni. 
4. UNEQUAL RELATIONSHIPS:  Understand that the uneven 
power dynamics of the school, in which adults have authority over 
former students, continues to shape those relationships. 
5. OTHER FRIENDS:  Remind all other members of your network of 
your position as an educator whose profile may be accessed by current 
or former students, and to monitor their posts to your network 
accordingly.  Conversely, be judicious in your postings to all friends 
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Acceptable use policies are strategies that school districts can employ 
to accomplish the dual goals of providing notice of expected behaviors to 
technology users and setting forth the consequences of misuse.73  Under 
acceptable use policies, teachers are expected to comply by signing 
waiver agreements as part of their employment contracts.74  In addition, 
many adopted acceptable use policies state that violations to the 
acceptable use agreements may result in dismissal or other disciplinary 
actions.75  Although varying methods have been used to restrict teachers’ 
                                                                                                             
sites, and act immediately to remove any material that may be 
inappropriate from your site whether posted by you or someone else. 
6. GROUPS IN YOUR SOCIAL NETWORK:  Associate with social 
networking groups consistent with healthy, pro-social activities and 
the mission and reputation of the school, acting with sensitivity within 
context of a diverse educational environment in which both students 
and adults practice tolerance and accept competing views. 
7. PRIVACY SETTINGS AND CONTENT:  Exercise care with 
privacy settings and profile content.  Content should be placed 
thoughtfully and periodically reviewed to maintain this standard. 
8. MISREPRESENTATION:  Faculty who use social networks 
should do so using their own name, not a pseudonym or nickname. 
9. PUBLIC INFORMATION:  Recognize that many former students 
have online connections with current students, and that information 
shared between school adults and former students is likely to be seen 
by current students as well. 
Id. at 1. 
73 See Kathleen Conn & Perry A. Zirkel, Commentary, Legal Aspects of Internet 
Accessibility and Use In K–12 Public Schools:  What Do School Districts Need to Know?, 146 
EDUC. L. REP. 1, 30 (2000) (providing general guidelines for drafting acceptable use policies).  
In addition to providing specific examples of the speech, expression, and conduct 
proscribed, Acceptable Use Policies, at a minimum, should state: 
1) the district’s expectation that district computing facilities will be 
used exclusively for educational purposes; 
2) the district’s expectations that students and teachers will use 
educationally appropriate speech and expression when using the 
Internet and other technological tools; 
3) users’ responsibilities to avoid copyright violations; 
4) users’ reasonable expectations (or lack of such expectations) of 
privacy in any and all uses of district technology resources; and 
5) users’ responsibility to avoid substantial and material disruption 
of the educational process for the school community. 
Id. 
74 See id. at 3 (discussing acceptable use policies and the legal implications of the 
increased use of such policies).  “Most public school districts require [that] teachers agree to 
abide by district policies as a condition of their employment.  The teacher contract itself 
details the consequences of teachers’ disregard or violation of its provisions.”  Id. at 34. 
75 See generally FINALSITE, supra note 72 (providing examples of various school 
acceptable use policies).  The acceptable user policy states, “[i]f the School believes that an 
employee’s activity on a social networking site, blog, or personal website may violate the 
School’s policies, the School may request that the employee cease such activity.  Depending 
on the severity of the incident, the employee may be subject to disciplinary action.”  Id at 2. 
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use of social networking sites, many have suggested that such restraints 
implicate a teacher’s First Amendment rights of free speech and 
expression.76  Teachers’ First Amendment free speech rights are 
considered under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence for public 
employees’ speech.77 
C. The Free Speech Rights of Public Employees 
As public employees, teachers’ speech is protected only if they speak 
out as citizens on matters of “public concern” and if their speech does 
not disrupt the school activity.78  In Pickering v. Board of Education, the 
Supreme Court set forth a balancing test to determine whether a teacher 
can be terminated for his or her speech.79  The Court stated that “[t]he 
problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the 
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and 
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of 
the public services it performs through its employees.”80  The Court’s 
                                                 
76 See supra Part II.A (discussing teachers’ First Amendment rights). 
77 See infra Part II.C (discussing the Court’s analytical framework for public employee 
speech). 
78 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. H.S. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 
(1968) (holding that where a teacher has made public statements that are critical of an 
employer but do not interfere with neither the teacher’s performance of his duties in the 
classroom, nor the regular operation of schools, then such speech is protected); see also 
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994) (stating that in order for a government 
employee’s speech to be protected, it must be on a matter of public concern).  In Waters, the 
Court held that a public hospital employee’s alleged speech was unprotected and could be 
the basis for discharge when the nurse’s speech was critical of one of the hospital’s 
departments.  Id. at 681.  The Court stated that, even if criticism of nursing cross-training 
was a matter of public concern, her comments substantially dampened another nurse’s 
interest in working in a particular department; therefore, her comments were unprotected.  
Id. 
79 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.  The Pickering case involved a public high school teacher 
who sent a letter to a local newspaper critical of the school’s handling of proposals for tax 
increases to raise new revenue for the schools.  Id. at 566.  As a result of the letter’s 
publication, the teacher was dismissed by the school board.  Id.  The board concluded that 
the teacher’s letter had been “detrimental to the best interests of the schools” because it 
contained false statements which “unjustifiably impugned” the “integrity, truthfulness, 
responsibility and competence” of the Board, “would be disruptive of faculty discipline, 
and would tend to foment ‘controversy, conflict, and dissension’ among teachers, 
administrators, the Board of Education, and the residents of the district.”  Id. at 567. 
80 Id. at 568.  The Court discusses some of the general lines along which an analysis of 
the controlling interests should run because there are various fact situations in which 
critical statements by employees are made against their superiors and an attempt to 
provide a general standard is not feasible.  Id. at 569.  The Court denies any suggestion that 
teachers may constitutionally be compelled to give up their First Amendment rights that 
they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in 
connection with the schools in which they work.  Id. at 568.  However, at the same time, the 
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balancing test requires a two-prong inquiry:  “1) whether the speech that 
led to the adverse employment action relate[d] to a matter of ‘public 
concern’; and 2) whether, under the balancing test, the public employer 
can demonstrate that its legitimate interests outweigh the employee’s 
First Amendment rights.”81  The State’s interests, as a public employer, 
include preventing disharmony and disruption in the workplace, as well 
as ensuring a school’s regular operations are maintained.82  Pickering laid 
the foundation for analyzing teachers’ speech; however, it left questions 
as to what exactly constitutes speech involving matters of “public 
concern.”83 
                                                                                                             
State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees, which are 
different than those it has in connection with regulating the speech of citizens in general.  
Id. 
81 Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2005).  In Hudson, a college instructor’s 
contract was not renewed after she and her students attended a public rally and march 
opposing the World Trade Organization.  Id. at 693.  The court applied Pickering’s two-
prong test.  Id. at 698–700.   
[Under the first prong the court] applied Pickering’s balancing test only 
when the employee spoke as a citizen upon matters of public concern 
rather than as an employee upon matters only of personal interest.  
Thus, private speech that involves nothing more than a complaint 
about a change in the employee’s own duties may give rise to 
discipline without imposing any special burden of justification on the 
government employer. 
Id. at 698 (quoting United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995)).  
However, the court found the college instructor’s speech did meet the public concern test 
because neither the instructor nor the students expressed any private concerns at the rally.  
Id. at 699.  However, the court, under Pickering’s second prong, found that the State’s 
interest in student safety and pedagogical oversight outweighed those of the instructor to 
participate in a public rally with her students.  Id. at 700–01. 
82 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (finding 
restrictions on free speech were inappropriate because the risk of a substantial disruption 
was negligible); Waters, 511 U.S. at 673 (holding the State employer has a significant interest 
in the efficiency of public services provided by and through its employees).  The court 
stated that:  
The government’s interest in achieving its goals as effectively and 
efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest 
when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer.  
The government cannot restrict the speech of the public at large just in 
the name of efficiency.  But where the government is employing 
someone for the very purpose of effectively achieving its goals, such 
restrictions may well be appropriate. 
Id. at 675; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569–71 (discussing that the State employer failed to show 
Pickering’s speech would create disharmony among employees); Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 
336 F.3d 185, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting the special position of a teacher and 
emphasizing the State’s interest in ensuring students feel at ease in the classroom). 
83 See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (acknowledging that “the 
boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined” and providing further guidance 
for proper application of the public concern test); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 380 
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Fifteen years later, in Connick v. Myers, the Court narrowly addressed 
the public concern question, and ultimately Pickering’s balancing test, by 
defining public concern as speech that is evidenced by the “content, 
form, and context of a given statement” and related to a “matter of 
political, social, or other concern to the community, [or] government 
officials.”84  If the employee’s speech does not touch upon a matter of 
public concern, then the second prong of Pickering’s analysis—balancing 
the interests of the speaker and  the State—should not be undertaken nor 
addressed.85  Instead, the Court held that “government officials should 
                                                                                                             
(1987) (holding that a speech wishing harm to the President touched on a matter of public 
concern because it occurred during a discussion about the President’s policies); Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (determining whether speech touches on a matter of 
public concern depends on the “content, form, and context of a given statement”); see also 
Seog Hun Jo, The Legal Standard on the Scope of Teachers’ Free Speech Rights in the School 
Setting, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 413, 417 (2002) (“The balancing test of Pickering, which was 
reiterated in all of Pickering’s progeny including Connick, has a logical flaw.”). 
84 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146–48.  In Connick, a former assistant district attorney strongly 
opposed a proposed transfer to a different section of the criminal court.  Id. at 140.  She 
distributed to other assistant district attorneys a questionnaire soliciting their views 
regarding criticism of the district attorney’s employment practices and whether any 
political pressure was placed on employees to work on political campaigns.  Id. at 141.  
Subsequently, she was fired because she refused to accept the transfer and because her 
distribution of the questionnaire was considered an act of insubordination.  Id.  After she 
was fired, Myers filed suit “contending that her employment was wrongfully terminated 
because she had exercised her constitutionally-protected right of free speech.”  Id.  See First 
Nat’l Bank of Bost. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 (1978) (holding the presumption that 
speech about any aspect of governmental affairs is also generally considered a matter of 
public concern); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (explaining that the First 
Amendment was intended to promote and protect the discussion of governmental affairs); 
see also CHARLES J. RUSSO, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 703 (7th ed., 2009) (discussing 
the subjects which have met the criteria of public concern)  Subjects of public concern 
include: 
School employees [who have] suffered adverse employment actions 
due to criticisms of or questions about a delay by school officials in 
implementing federally mandated programs for students with 
disabilities; a medication policy; a policy that prevented teachers from 
making critical statements about school officials unless made directly 
to the person(s) being criticized; a principal’s failure to implement a 
school improvement plan; a board’s child abuse reporting policy; and 
a teacher’s complaining about classroom safety; even though he 
expressed his views privately, through approved, formal channels. 
Id. 
85 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.  The dissent found three primary flaws in the majority’s 
reasoning.  Id. at 157.  The majority considered the form and context of the speech, first in 
determining whether the speech touched on a matter of public concern and again in 
determining the disruptive impact of that speech.  Id. at 157–58.  The dissent maintained 
that the form and context of the speech was not relevant in considering whether the speech 
was on a matter of public concern.  Id. at 158.  That an employee chose to conduct the 
speech in private did not lessen its public impact.  Id.  Nor did the form of the employee’s 
speech characterize its content.  Id. at 159.  Second, the majority narrowed the scope of 
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enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices without intrusive oversight 
by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment,” consequently, 
providing greater deference to public employers.86 
To date, there are three notable cases involving teachers who 
claimed that their First Amendment rights were violated due to social 
networking use.87  In each case, the Pickering-Connick analysis was 
applied. 88  In Spanierman v. Hughes, Jeffrey Spanierman’s contract for 
employment was not renewed after the school’s principal learned that 
Mr. Spanierman communicated with students through his Myspace page 
“about homework, to learn more about the students so he could relate to 
them better, and to conduct casual, non-school related discussions.”89  
The court applied a three-prong test in determining whether 
                                                                                                             
those things that constitute a matter of public concern extensively, excluding speech on 
some important public issues, such as the performance of elected officials and government 
employee morale.  Id. at 161.  Thus, the dissent concluded that the content of the 
questionnaire was of public concern “because it discussed subjects that could reasonably be 
expected to be of interest to persons seeking to develop informed opinions about the 
manner in which . . . an elected official . . . discharges his responsibilities.”  Id. at 163.  
Third, the majority misapplied the Pickering test by holding that the mere apprehension of 
disruption was sufficient justification for suppression of speech.  Id.  See Bradshaw v. 
Pittsburgh Indep. Sch. Dist., 207 F.3d 814, 816 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that full First 
Amendment protection only attaches to speech that the teacher has shown to rise to the 
level of a public concern); Denton v. Morgan, 136 F.3d 1038, 1042 (5th Cir. 1998) (asserting 
that a public employee’s speech is only protected when it addresses a matter of public 
concern). 
86 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.  The court held that “federal court is not the appropriate 
forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency 
allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.”  Id. at 147.  According to Connick’s 
interpretation of Pickering, a public employer is not required to wait for an actual 
disruption in the office before taking action.  Id. at 152. 
87 Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 297 (D. Conn. 2008); see also Richerson v. 
Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637, 637 (9th Cir. 2009); Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 
WL 5093140, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008). 
88 See, e.g., Richerson, 337 F. App’x at 637 (ruling in favor of the school board).  See 
generally Snyder, 2008 WL 5093140, at *5; Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 297. 
89 Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 298.  The contents of Spanierman’s profile page were 
varied, including “comments from [Spanierman] to other MySpace users, comments from 
other MySpace users to [Spanierman], pictures, blogs, and poetry.”  Id. at 310.  Specifically, 
the page contained a conversation with one student which stated, “I just like to have fun 
and goof on you guys.  If you don’t like it.  Kiss my brass!  LMAO [Laughing My Ass Off],” 
and poetry in opposition to the Iraq War.  Id. at 310, 312.  In January of 2006, Spanierman 
met with a specialist from the Department of Education concerning his “MySpace 
activities” and was informed that the Department would not renew his contract for the 
2006–2007 school year.  Id. at 299.  Spanierman brought a Section 1983 claim, arguing 
unsuccessfully that his First Amendment rights had been violated.  Id. at 299.  The principal 
conveyed to Spanierman that “he had exercised poor judgment as a teacher” by connecting 
with students through MySpace.  Id. 
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Spanierman’s speech was protected.90  The court examined (1) whether 
the speech was a matter of public concern, (2) whether adverse 
employment action had occurred, and (3) whether there was a causal 
connection between the speech and the adverse employment action.91  
The court held that most of Mr. Spanierman’s speech on his Myspace 
page did not relate to matters of public concern and therefore was 
unprotected by the First Amendment.92  Likewise, the court found that 
Mr. Spanierman’s speech was “likely to disrupt school activities.”93  
However, after affirming that Mr. Spanierman’s speech was not a matter 
of public concern, the court failed to apply the second prong of the 
Pickering analysis, which involves balancing the interests of the speaker 
against those of the State.94 
Only three months after Spanierman, the court in Snyder v. Millersville 
University, upheld the removal of a student-teacher, Stacey Snyder, after 
she posted a photograph that depicted her wearing a pirate hat and 
holding a plastic cup with a caption that read “drunken pirate.”95  
Applying the first prong of the Pickering-Connick analysis, the court held 
that Ms. Snyder’s speech was not a matter of public concern, stating “[s]o 
long as employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public 
concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary 
                                                 
90 See Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 309 (holding there was no indication that 
Spanierman made his statements pursuant to his official duties, and his statements on 
Myspace were not pursuant to his responsibilities as a teacher, therefore indicating that 
Garcetti is not dispositive and the three-prong test can be applied). 
91 See id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146) (“Central to this inquiry is whether the speech 
may ‘be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern.’”). 
92 Id. at 310–11.  In applying the test, the court found that a portion of Spanierman’s 
Myspace speech, a poem written in opposition to the Iraq War, was protected.  Id. at 310.  
The court dismissed the remainder of Spanierman’s speech as unprotected because it was 
not on a matter of public concern.  Id.  Focusing on the poem, the court looked at whether 
Spanierman suffered an adverse employment action and whether there was a causal 
connection between his poem and the decision not to renew his contract.  Id. at 311. 
93 Id. at 313.  The court held: 
It is reasonable for the Defendants to expect the Plaintiff, a teacher 
with supervisory authority over students, to maintain a professional, 
respectful association with those students. . . . Plaintiff would 
communicate with students as if he were their peer, not their teacher.  
Such conduct could very well disrupt the learning atmosphere of a 
school, which sufficiently outweighs the value of Plaintiff’s MySpace 
speech. 
Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 
2008).  Snyder’s page also discussed problems between herself and her cooperating teacher.  
Id.  Snyder, in one post to her Myspace page, stated, “[Students] keep asking me why I 
won’t apply [for a position at the school].  Do you think it would hurt me to tell them the 
real reason (or who the problem [is])?”  Id. at *5. 
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for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.”96  The court 
noted that, through Ms. Synder’s own admission, her expression on 
Myspace was on purely personal matters.97  Therefore, in looking first at 
whether Snyder’s speech was on a matter of public concern, the court 
eliminated any further analysis and allowed the school board to dismiss 
her without fear of constitutional violations.98 
In a recent decision, Richerson v. Beckon, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals rejected a teacher’s First Amendment argument concerning 
comments made on a personal blog.99  Tara Richerson, a mentor for 
beginning teachers, was demoted from a K–12 science curriculum 
                                                 
96 Id. at *14.  The court held that the plaintiff’s position as a student teacher subjected her 
to the status of a certified teacher, thus enabling the court to apply the Pickering progeny 
public concern analysis.  Id. at *10. 
97 Id. at *16.  On several occasions, Snyder informed the students during class that she 
had a Myspace page.  Id. at *5.  Synder was advised that it was not proper to discuss her 
Myspace account with the students, and a teaching supervisor urged her not to allow 
students to become involved in her personal life.  Id.  At one point, Synder posted the 
following message: 
I have nothing to hide.  I am over 21, and I don’t say anything that will 
hurt me (in the long run).  Plus, I don’t think that they would stoop 
that low as to mess with my future.  So, bring on the love!  I figure a 
couple of students will actually send me a message when I am no 
longer their official teacher.  They keep asking me why I won’t apply 
there.  Do you think it would hurt me to tell them the real reason (or 
who the problem was)? 
Id. 
98 Id. at *16.  As a result of Snyder’s Myspace conduct, Snyder was prohibited from 
graduating from Millersville University with a degree in education.  Id. at *13.  The court 
upheld the University’s decision, stating that Snyder failed to complete the “approved 
teacher preparation program—which requires successful completion of Student Teaching” 
and was therefore ineligible for licensure.  Id. 
99 See Richerson v. Beckon, No. C07-5590 JKA, 2008 WL 833076, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 
27, 2008), aff’d, 337 Fed. App’x 637 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing the content of Richerson’s 
blog entries).  The court included the following blog entry entitled “Save us White Boy!” to 
demonstrate the nature of Richerson’s comments: 
I met with the new me today:  the person who will take my summer 
work and make it a full-time year-round position.  I was on the 
interview committee for this job and this guy was my third 
choice . . . and a reluctant one at that.  I truly hope that I have to eat 
my words about this guy. . . . But after spending time with this guy 
today, I think Boss Lady 2.0 made the wrong call in hiring him . . . . 
He comes across as a smug know-it-all creep.  And that’s probably 
the nicest way I can describe him. . . . He has a reputation of crapping 
on secretaries and not being able to finish tasks on his own. . . . And 
he’s white.  And male.  I know he can’t help that, but I think the 
district would have done well to recruit someone who has other 
connections to the community. . . . Mighty White Boy looks like he’s 
going to crash and burn. 
Id. 
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specialist to a classroom teaching position after she posted comments 
describing an administrator as “a smug know-it-all creep” who has “a 
reputation of crapping on secretaries.”100  The court held that Richerson’s 
transfer was appropriate under the balancing test laid out in Pickering.101  
However, the court assumed without actually deciding that some of 
Richerson’s speech was of public concern.102  Nevertheless, when 
applying the second prong of the Pickering analysis, the court considered 
relevant factors, such as whether Richerson’s speech disrupted co-
worker relations or whether such speech interfered with the employee’s 
performance of his or her duties.103  In the end, the court tipped the 
balance in favor of the interests of the school district.104  Moreover, when 
                                                 
100 Id.  The court noted that not only did the first blog posting represent a breach of 
confidentiality, but “it was racist, sexist, and bordered on vulgar,” and it was inconsistent 
with the types of public concern issues contemplated by the Pickering line of cases.  Id. at *4. 
101 Richerson, 337 Fed. App’x at 638.  The court held, “[w]e nevertheless affirm the 
summary judgment because Richerson’s transfer was appropriate under the balancing test 
laid out in Pickering . . . .  Id. (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. H.S. Dist. 205, Will, 
Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).  “Richerson’s publicly-available blog included several 
highly personal and vituperative comments about her employers, union representatives, 
and fellow teachers.” Id. 
102 Id. at 638.  The court decided that the “district court did not err in concluding that the 
legitimate administrative interests of the School District outweighed Richerson’s First 
Amendment interests in not being transferred because of her speech.”  Id. at 639.  See 
Lindsay A. Hitz, Note, Protecting Blogging:  The Need for an Actual Disruption Standard in 
Pickering, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1151, 1179–81 (2010) (discussing the court’s reasoning 
behind finding that Richerson’s speech was a matter of public concern). 
103 Richerson, 337 Fed. App’x at 638.  The court reasoned that Richerson’s speech had a 
“significantly deleterious effect” in that “several individuals refused to work with 
Richerson in the future.”  Id.  Additionally, the court concluded that “few teachers would 
expect that they could enter into a confidential and trusting relationship with Richerson 
after reading her blog” and that such effect demonstrates injury to the school’s legitimate 
interests.  Id.  See Interview with Todd Fuller, Communications Director, Missouri State 
Teachers Association (Dec. 28, 2011) (describing the secondary effects of teachers’ online 
social networking use and how other teachers, students, and parents are usually unwilling 
to cooperate with a teacher who was disciplined for his or her online social networking 
use).  Mr. Fuller stated, “We are willing to fight for teachers’ rights, but we can’t control 
some of the consequences from teachers’ social networking use.”  Id. 
104 Richerson, 337 Fed. App’x at 639; see Paul M. Secunda, Blogging While (Publicly) 
Employed:  Some First Amendment Implications, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 679, 691 (2009) 
(discussing Richerson’s speech as applied under the Pickering and Connick analysis). 
Applying this balance to the Richerson case, it appears clear that the 
school district would have won the balancing of interests.  Although, 
the court did not expressly base its decision on Pickering, there is 
language in other parts of the opinion that implies that the district’s 
interest in efficiency would have outweighed Richerson’s First 
Amendment concerns.  More specifically, Richerson was causing a 
substantial disruption in the workplace and the school district had the 
right to foster a harmonious working environment.  Certainly, given 
her penchant for gossip, it does not seem that the school district should 
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deciding similar cases involving teachers’ First Amendment free speech 
claims, it is necessary to closely examine not only the competing interests 
of both teachers and school boards but also the Court’s analysis for 
public employees’ speech.105 
III.  ANALYSIS 
This part of the Note analyzes and assesses teachers’ speech under 
Pickering’s balancing test, Connick’s “public concern” test, and Missouri’s 
statute.106  Part III.A examines the competing rights of both teachers’, in 
their use of social networking sites, and school districts’ interest in 
restricting teachers’ online speech.107  Next, Part III.B reveals the flawed 
logic within the Pickering balancing test established by the Court for 
analyzing public employee speech as applied to social networking.108  
Part III.C of this Note analyzes Connick’s public concern test and argues 
that this test is inapplicable to purely private speech outside of the 
workplace.109  Part III.D addresses the inconsistencies courts face when 
forced to apply the Pickering-Connick analysis to teachers’ speech on 
social networking sites.110  Finally, Part III.E argues that the Missouri 
statute is unconstitutional because it not only prohibits teacher-student 
                                                                                                             
have been forced to tolerate her as a mentor in an instructional 
program that requires trust and sensitivity. 
Id. 
105 See Karin B. Hoppmann, Note, Concern with Public Concern:  Toward A Better Definition 
of the Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L. REV. 993, 996–97 (1997) (arguing for a 
new standard for public employee speech).  “If the Court insists on preserving the 
threshold public concern test, it should recast the test to focus on the distinction between 
workplace speech and speech outside the working environment.”  Id. at 1119–20.  The 
author argues that, “[i]f the speech is of public concern, it deserves full and absolute 
protection.  If it is not of public concern, it should still be evaluated under the second prong 
of the Pickering/Connick test:  the Court should weigh the speech’s ‘value’ against its 
potential for disruption.”  Id.  Consequently, “[s]peech outside the scope of employment 
should thereby receive full protection, while speech within the scope of employment may 
be subjected to the balancing test currently embodied in the second prong of the 
Pickering/Connick test.  Id. 
106 See infra Parts III.B–E (discussing the tests used for analyzing public employee speech, 
as well as the constitutionality of Missouri’s statute restricting teacher-student 
communication through social networking sites). 
107 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the competing interest of both the teachers and the 
school districts concerning teachers’ use of social networking sites). 
108 See infra Part III.B (dissecting the Pickering balancing test and discussing the Court’s 
logical flaws within the balancing analysis). 
109 See infra Part III.C (arguing that Connick’s “public concern” analysis is inapplicable to 
speech outside the workplace, including teachers’ speech via social networking sites). 
110 See infra Part III.D (evaluating both tests laid out in Pickering and Connick as applied to 
cases involving teachers’ speech via social networking sites). 
Akiti: Facebook off Limits?  Protecting Teachers' Private Speech on Soci
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
148 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
communication but restricts teachers’ private speech via social 
networking sites as well.111 
A. Teacher vs. School Board Interests 
Because public school teachers play a unique role in shaping the 
minds of our youth, teachers are held to higher standard of 
professionalism and moral character.112  School districts and 
administrators, as public employers, undoubtedly have an interest not 
only in fostering an environment that promotes effective learning but 
also in maintaining its employees’ conduct, because inappropriate 
conduct could potentially interfere with that mission.113  As a result, 
school districts have an interest in regulating teacher speech that occurs 
outside of the classroom, primarily because teachers’ conduct, regardless 
of when or where it is occurring, reflects on the teacher’s own 
professional status and also on the school district’s image.114  Even 
though a school district has an interest in ensuring that its teachers are 
held to a higher professional standard, courts must be careful not to 
allow this interest to extend so far as to infringe on a teacher’s basic First 
Amendment freedoms when that teacher speaks outside his or her duties 
as an educator.115 
                                                 
111 See infra Part III.E (discussing the unconstitutionality of Missouri’s statute restricting 
teachers’ speech via social networking sites). 
112  See Fleming et. al., supra note 47, at 67–68 (asserting that teachers are subject to greater 
scrutiny due to their elevated stature and special position in society).  The author argues 
that:  
[T]eaching is an important profession, in which the educator may 
serve as a role model, mentor, friend, and/or parental figure.  Indeed, 
teachers have an extraordinary responsibility:  they “leave indelible 
impressions on the minds of their young students, because they are 
entrusted with the safe keeping and education of children during their 
most impressionable and formative years.” 
Id. at 69. 
113 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (“Government employers, like private 
employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; 
without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services”); see 
also Hutchinson, supra note 46, at 501–02 (discussing school districts liability for matters 
that harm both students and their education environment, such as a teacher-on-student 
sexual harassment). 
114 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. H.S. Dist. 205, Will Cnty. Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 
(1968) (holding that the government functions as an employer, it has interests “that differ 
significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the 
citizenry in general”); see also supra note 25 (detailing numerous instances where teachers 
have been disciplined because of their inappropriate speech and conduct with students via 
social networking sites). 
115 See infra Part IV (proposing that the analytical guidelines that are entered into when 
examining teacher speech be changed). 
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It is imperative that the law recognize a teacher’s interest in speaking 
as a public employee because it serves an educational purpose, which is 
drastically different from the teacher’s interest in her own private 
speech.116  Although the Pickering-Connick test is appropriate for 
assessing the free speech claims of public employees, it should not apply 
when an individual is speaking as a private citizen on purely private 
matters.117  To highlight some of the problems associated with the 
Pickering-Connick test, Part III.B evaluates these decisions in terms of how 
they apply to analyzing teachers’ speech via social media.118 
B.  Balancing Interests of Citizen vs. Employee under the Pickering Analysis 
Courts have unanimously restricted teachers’ speech on social 
networking sites by balancing the interests of the teacher against those of 
the State.119  In such cases, courts frequently use the test articulated in 
Pickering, which requires a court to balance “the interests of the teacher, 
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the 
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees.”120  Although the 
Court in Pickering laid the foundation for evaluating teachers’ speech, 
this decision left questions as to what exactly constitutes speech 
involving matters of public concern.121 
Although the balancing test articulated in Pickering attempts to set a 
proper standard for determining when a teacher’s speech may be 
regulated, the Court’s own application of this test is flawed.122  
                                                 
116 See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text (describing the various educational 
benefits of teacher-student communication and interactions through Facebook). 
117 See infra Part IV (arguing that the Pickering-Connick analysis is not applicable to 
teachers’ purely private speech on social networking sites). 
118 See infra Part II.B (scrutinizing the ways in which courts have balanced interests of 
citizens versus employees under the test set forth in Pickering). 
119 See Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 313 (D. Conn. 2008) (holding that 
Spanierman’s conduct on Myspace was disruptive to school activities and was, therefore, 
outweighed by the school board’s interests in restricting such speech). 
120 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
121 See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (acknowledging that “the 
boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined,” and providing further guidance 
for proper application of the public concern test); see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 
378, 380 (1987) (holding that speech wishing harm to the President touched on a “matter of 
public concern” because it occurred during a discussion about the President’s policies); 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (determining whether speech touches on a 
matter of public concern depends on the “content, form, and context of a given statement”). 
122 See Jo, supra note 83, at 418–19(discussing the “logical flaw” in the Pickering balance 
because the Court did not treat the teacher as a general citizen in its balance). 
[The Pickering decision] suggests that only if a teacher could be 
regarded as a citizen whose speech would have little effect on the 
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Specifically, the only time that employment-related interests should be 
weighed against a teacher’s First Amendment rights is when the teacher 
speaks solely as an employee and not as a member of the general 
public.123  Although the Court in Pickering stated that it regarded 
Pickering as a private citizen, the Court placed far too much weight on 
his duties as a teacher in its analysis.124  Instead, the Court should have 
maintained its position when considering Pickering as a member of the 
general public. 125  Since it did not, the Court was able to justify entering 
into the balancing test, which should only be utilized in situations where 
the teacher is speaking on matters that implicate the government’s 
interest as an employer.126  Consequently, the Court’s decision in 
Pickering gives the State far more leeway in qualifying a teacher as an 
employee, which bolsters its ability to tip the balancing scale in its favor 
and thereby limiting teachers’ speech.127  The Court in Connick followed 
in Pickering’s footsteps and further limited teachers’ private speech.128 
                                                                                                             
teacher’s employment relationship, would he be entitled to the same 
First Amendment protection as if he were a member of the general 
public; if not, his comments would not be so protected. 
Id. at 417. 
123 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574; see Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798 
(5th Cir. 1989) (“[P]ublic employees are entitled to the same measure of constitutional 
protection as enjoyed by their civilian counterparts when speaking as ‘citizens’ and not as 
‘employees.’”); see also Terrell v. Univ. of Tex. Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360, 1362 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(“[O]ur task is to decide whether the speech at issue in a particular case was made 
primarily in the plaintiff's role as citizen or primarily in his role as employee.”). 
124 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 157 (1983) (holding that it was necessary to regard the teacher 
as a member of the general public).  Similar to Pickering, the Court in Connick inquired into 
employment-related activities, such as whether the teacher’s speech had an effect on the 
operation of the school.  Id.  See also Jo, supra note 83, at 419 (“The Pickering Court did 
‘conclude that it is necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the general public he 
seeks to be.’  Nevertheless, the Court inquired into such employment-related values as 
maintaining discipline and harmony among coworkers, in addition to any effect of the 
speech on the actual operation of the school.”). 
125 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572 (describing Pickering as a “teacher [who] has made 
erroneous public statements upon issues then currently the subject of public attention, 
which are critical of his ultimate employer but which are neither shown nor can be 
presumed to have in any way either impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily 
duties”).  The Court concluded that “the interest of the school administration in limiting 
teachers’ opportunities to contribute to public debate is not significantly greater than its 
interest in limiting a similar contribution by any member of the general public.”  Id. at 573. 
126 Pickering, 461 U.S. at 571; see Jo, supra note 83, at 418 (“When a teacher speaks as a 
citizen, the interests of the school system in limiting his speech should be no more than 
when any other citizen speaks.”).  If a teacher speaks in her role as an employee, then the 
school’s interests should be balanced against the teacher’s constitutional rights, which 
includes taking into account employment-related interests such as “discipline, teaching 
performance, and harmony in the daily work.”  Id. 
127 See Jo, supra note 83, at 419 (“[W]hen teachers engage in expression as citizens outside 
the context of employment, the government cannot contend that employment-related 
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C.  Narrowing the Scope of Teachers’ First Amendment Rights Under 
Connick’s “Public Concern” Test 
The Court took a step further in limiting employees’ speech-based 
claims in its decision in Connick.129  The Court in Connick first determined 
whether the speech at issue involved a matter of public concern.130  The 
second step then required that only speech on a matter of public concern 
be subjected to the Pickering balance and thus potentially eligible for 
protection.131  By establishing the threshold inquiry of whether the 
speech relates to a matter of public concern, the Court effectively 
eliminated a teacher’s ability to enjoy protection for her speech through 
social media.132  It is unlikely that a court will ever find that such speech, 
which is inherently private, touches on matters of public concern, 
depriving it of First Amendment protection.133  As a result, the teacher 
                                                                                                             
values should be weighed against teachers’ interests in the Pickering balance.”).  
Furthermore, “when speaking as a citizen and not as an employee, teachers should be 
entitled to the same measure of constitutional protection as enjoyed by their civilian 
counterparts.”  Id. at 418. 
128 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 149. (holding that an employee grievance over internal office 
matters did not meet the definition of public concern in the public employee speech 
context).  Public employee speech concerning internal office affairs is considered speech of 
purely private concern.  Id.  But see First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 
(1978) (holding the presumption that speech about any aspect of governmental affairs is 
also generally considered a matter of public concern). 
129 See Jo, supra note 83, at 419 (“Connick follows the presumption that an employee’s 
statement as a mere citizen is inherently concerned with the public affairs, while his speech 
as an employee may pertain to personal grievances and internal disputes.”).  “The counter-
poise of this presumption and the possibility has led to the burden being unfairly placed on 
the teacher to demonstrate that his speech was about a matter of public concern.”  Id. 
130 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (holding that if an employee’s speech does not touch upon 
a matter of public concern, then the courts should not examine the government’s reasons 
for discharging an employee).  The court stated that, “[w]hen employee expression cannot 
be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the 
community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, 
without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.”  Id. 
131 See Jo, supra note 83, at 421 (“[T]he Court wrong-footed [Pickering] by establishing the 
threshold inquiry of whether the employee’s statements were upon ‘a matter of public 
concern’ before balancing the competing interests of the speaker and the state.”).  If the 
answer to the question of whether the speech is a matter of public concern is not 
affirmative, the case is determined against the employee without undertaking the Pickering 
balance.  Id.  Therefore, Connick’s threshold standard marked a fundamental departure 
from Pickering, because in Pickering, “the Court focused on exploring what actual interests 
were involved, and attempted to balance them in a fair way.”  Id. at 421–22. 
132 See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text (explaining the Court’s decision in 
Connick). 
133 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the three primary 
flaws in the majority’s reasoning).  The majority considered the form and context of the 
speech, first in determining whether the speech touched on a matter of public concern and 
again in determining the disruptive impact of that speech.  Id. at 157–58.  The dissent 
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never receives the chance to have his or her rights balanced against the 
State’s interests as required by Pickering.134  In placing a greater focus on 
the content of the speech rather than on the Pickering balancing test, 
Connick essentially restricted Pickering to a point where little, if any, 
protection is provided to teachers who wish to voice their opinions on 
social media sites.135 
Furthermore, school boards may avoid Pickering and First 
Amendment liability altogether by successfully characterizing a teacher’s 
speech as private.136  Connick conveys what types of speech are 
considered matters of public concern by describing speech that does not 
in fact constitute a matter of public concern, such as speech concerning 
purely personal matters.137  As a result, lower courts have inconsistently 
applied the test because the central concern is addressing only internal 
personal matters and, therefore, such decisions fail to take into account 
                                                                                                             
maintained that the form and context of the speech was not relevant in considering 
whether the speech was on a matter of public concern.  Id. at 159–60.  That an employee 
chose to conduct the speech in private did not lessen its public import.  Id. at 160.  Nor did 
the form of the employee’s speech characterize its content.  Id. at 159.  Second, the majority 
extensively narrowed the scope of those things that constitute a matter of public concern, 
excluding speech on some important public issues, such as the performance of elected 
officials and government employee morale.  Id. at 164–65.  Thus, the dissent concluded that 
the content of the questionnaire was of public concern “because it discussed subjects that 
could reasonably be expected to be of interest to persons seeking to develop informed 
opinions about the manner in which . . . an elected official . . . discharges his 
responsibilities.”  Id. at 163.  Third, the majority misapplied the Pickering test by holding 
that the mere apprehension of disruption was sufficient justification for suppression of 
speech.  Id. at 166. 
134 See Hoppmann, supra note 105, at 1004 (analyzing Connick’s application of the public 
concern test and arguing that “[t]he degree of public concern becomes a factor in this 
[Pickering] balance”).  After applying the test to the facts of the case, the Connick Court 
found that “Myers’s questionnaire consisted entirely of unprotected, non-public concern 
speech, except for the single question about pressure to participate in public campaigns.”  
Id.  Because the “questionnaire’s potential for disruption of the workplace outweighed the 
[F]irst [A]mendment value of that single question,” all of Myer’s speech was unprotected.  
Id. 
135  See Secunda, supra note 104, at 691 (“Richerson suggests that public employee bloggers 
might have the hardest time finding First Amendment speech protection under Connick’s 
public concern test, given the personal nature of many blog postings.”). 
136 See Connick 461 U.S. at 147–48 (holding that courts must look at the “content, form, 
and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record” to determine whether 
an employee’s speech touches upon a matter of public concern).  Justice Brennan, in the 
dissenting opinion, argued that “[i]n my view, however, whether a particular statement by 
a public employee is addressed to a subject of public concern does not depend on where it 
was said or why.”  Id. at 160. 
137 See id. at 152 (holding that “we do not see the necessity for an employer to allow 
events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of 
working relationships is manifest before taking action” and thus illustrating that the 
Court’s central focus was internal speech and not speech outside the workplace). 
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speech that occurs outside the workplace.138  Connick’s public concern 
test fails to focus on the distinction between workplace speech and 
speech outside the working environment, because the test requires both 
a content-based (what) and context-based (where) analysis.139  By 
focusing on the content of an employee’s speech, rather than the context, 
the Court classifies an employee’s speech as anything but speech 
concerning matters of public concern, thereby eliminating Pickering’s 
balancing test.140  Because of the difficulties associated with these two 
central decisions, lower courts have reached inconsistent outcomes when 
examining teachers’ speech on social networking sites.141 
                                                 
138 See Hoppmann, supra note 105, at 1008 (“Though the Supreme Court in Pickering and 
Connick established a new [F]irst [A]mendment test to cover public employee free speech, it 
failed to define a key element of that test:  public concern.  This has led to great confusion 
among the lower courts.”).  Furthermore, “[i]n seeking to apply the Pickering/Connick test, 
the lower courts engage in convoluted factor analysis schemes to determine what speech is 
of ‘public concern.’”  Id. 
139 See id at 1019–20 (proposing the elimination of the content-based analysis in favor of a 
pure context-based analysis).   
If the Court insists on preserving the threshold public concern test, it 
should recast the test to focus on the distinction between workplace 
speech and speech outside the working environment.  This distinction 
can be best described by analogy to the ‘scope of employment’ test 
currently used in both agency and employment law. 
Id. 
140 See id. at 1012 (illustrating the problems with a content-based analysis of the public 
concern test).  Hoppmann argues that defining public concern solely on the content of the 
speech creates dangers of misapplication and learnability.  Id.  Hoppmann contends that: 
The Court later reinjected content-based public concern analysis into 
its defamation jurisprudence based on Connick and in apparent 
disregard for its own proclamation.  The Court’s self-criticism, 
however, must still hold true.  A judge cannot feasibly ‘learn’ what is 
of public concern if the category is defined by the actual content of 
the speech; there is nowhere to turn for a definition of which issues 
concern the public.  The Court could perhaps look to the media’s 
newsworthiness determinations as a guide to public concern issues.  
Yet basing public concern on media proclamations strips the actual 
“public” of the power to determine what speech is of concern and 
delegates that power to an entity whose concerns do not necessarily 
reflect those of the whole public.  It also creates an ever-changing 
definition of public concern--what is news today may not be news 
tomorrow, nor may it be news somewhere else--that further decreases 
the predictability of the public concern test. 
Id. at 1012–13. 
141 See infra Part III.D (analyzing the inconsistencies that have emerged post Pickering-
Connick). 
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D. Inconsistencies in Applying Pickering and Connick to Teachers’ Speech 
on Social Networking Sites 
The district courts in the Spanierman, Snyder, and Richerson cases 
illustrate the difficulties and inconsistencies caused when courts are 
forced to apply Pickering and its progeny.142  In employing the Pickering-
Connick analysis, the court concluded that almost none of Spanierman’s 
Myspace page touched on matters of public concern and was therefore 
unprotected.143  By determining that the speech was not a matter of 
concern, the court failed to recognize and take into account any speech 
that could be classified as a matter of public concern, such as a political 
poem that was posted.144  The court’s holding permitted the school board 
to restrain Spanierman’s speech even if some of the speech was 
protected.145  As a result, Spanierman’s First Amendment claim failed 
without ever considering his interest in commenting on political issues 
or matters of public concern.146 
Furthermore, by focusing only on the Pickering-Connick analysis, the 
court failed to recognize and consider Spanierman’s academic 
freedom.147  Spanierman used his Myspace account to “communicate 
with students about homework [and] to learn more about the students so 
he could relate to them better,” which was an application of 
Spanierman’s right to choose and convey his instructional methods to his 
                                                 
142 See supra notes 87–98 and accompanying text (detailing the courts’ application of the 
Pickering-Connick tests in Spanierman and Synder). 
143 See Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310–11 (D. Conn. 2008) (“[A]lmost 
none of the contents of the Plaintiff’s profile page touched on matters of public concern.”).  
The court held that a majority of Spanierman’s profile page contained personal 
conversations between Spanierman and other Myspace users or creative writing.  Id. 
144 See id at 310 (“The only portion of the profile page that the Plaintiff argues is protected 
speech is a poem. . . .”).  The court ultimately concludes that, “construing all ambiguities in 
favor of the Plaintiff, the poem could constitute a political statement.  That is, one could 
consider this poem to be an expression of the Plaintiff’s opposition to the Iraq War.”  Id. at 
310–11. 
145 See id. at 312 (discussing that Spanierman’s protected speech concerning the Iraq War 
was not connected to his termination and that his speech on Myspace created a school 
disruption).  Spanierman failed to establish the necessary casual connection between his 
exercise of the right to free speech and the allegedly retaliatory action against him.  Id. at 
311.  The court held that “it was not unreasonable for the [school board] to find that 
[Spanierman’s] conduct was disruptive to school activities” and that there was “evidence 
of complaints about [Spanierman’s] Myspace activities.”  Id. at 312–13.  The court indicated 
that “[s]uch conduct could very well disrupt the learning atmosphere of a school, which 
sufficiently outweighs the value of [Spanierman’s] Myspace speech.”  Id. at 313. 
146 Id. at 311. 
147 See Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1049 (6th Cir. 2001) (recognizing 
teachers’ right of academic freedom); see also supra Part II.A (describing teachers’ 
substantive right to express and convey instructional methods to their students). 
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students.148  However, the court did not address Spanierman’s academic 
rights because Spanierman claimed a violation of his free speech rights, 
which is distinct from a teacher’s right to express or choose a teaching 
method that serves an educational purpose.149 
Similarly, the court in Synder incorrectly applied the Pickering-
Connick analysis and, as a result, upheld Synder’s removal from her 
public high school placement.150  The court concluded that the “drunken-
pirate” photo and comments about her cooperating teachers were in fact 
purely personal speech and not a matter of public concern; however, the 
court failed to determine whether Synder’s speech was that of a teacher 
or a citizen.151  By focusing primarily on whether the speech was a matter 
of public concern, rather than considering whether Synder was speaking 
as a private citizen or an employee, the court eliminated further 
analysis.152  As a result, under the Pickering-Connick analysis, teachers’ 
purely private speech via social networking is unprotected even if a 
teacher is speaking as a private citizen, because the online speech is not a 
matter of public concern.153 
Lastly, the court in Richerson was correct in deciding that the 
Pickering-Connick analysis was the appropriate standard to be used in 
                                                 
148 Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 298; see Cary v. Bd. of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 539–42 (10th 
Cir. 1979) (recognizing that a teacher’s First Amendment rights encompass the notion of 
academic freedom to exercise professional judgment in selecting topics and materials for 
use in the course of the educational process). 
149 See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361 (1st Cir. 1969) (holding that the “question in 
this case is whether a teacher may, for demonstrated educational purposes,” receive 
constitutional protection, separate and distinct from teachers’ private speech).  The court 
noted that teachers’ principle argument is “that his conduct was within his competence as a 
teacher, as a matter of academic freedom, whether the defendants approved of it or not.”  
Id. at 360. 
150 See Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 
2008) (holding that Millersville University did not violate Snyder’s First Amendment 
rights). 
151 See id. at *1 (holding that Synder’s position as a teacher subjected her to the status of a 
certified teacher, thus enabling the court to apply the Pickering progeny public concern 
analysis); see also Jo, supra note 83, at 419 (“[W]hen teachers engage in expression as citizens 
outside the context of employment, the government cannot contend that employment-
related values should be weighed against teachers’ interests in the Pickering balance.”).  
When speaking as a citizen and not as an employee, “teachers should be entitled to the 
same measure of constitutional protection as enjoyed by their civilian counterparts” and 
the “interests of the State vis-à-vis employees are certainly different from its interests in 
relation to a citizen.”  Id. at 418–19. 
152 See Snyder, 2008 WL 5093140, at *16 (“[T]he First Amendment does not protect 
Plaintiff’s Myspace posting.”) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).  Once 
the court eliminated further analysis, the school board could dismiss Synder without fear 
of constitutional violations.  Id. at *11. 
153 See infra Part IV (proposing a test designed to protect teachers’ purely private speech 
via social networking sites). 
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ultimately determining that Richerson’s First Amendment rights had not 
been violated.154  The court properly categorized Richerson’s online 
speech, describing an administrator as a “smug know-it-all creep,” as 
unprotected speech because Richerson was speaking as an employee 
about matters directly related to her employment as a teacher.155  
Although the court assumed that some of Richerson’s speech was a 
matter of public concern because Richerson’s blog was publicly 
available, Richerson was not speaking as a citizen on purely private 
matters.156  In deciding whether the application of the Pickering-Connick 
analysis was in fact appropriate, the court was successful in its 
straightforward application.157 
Teachers speaking as citizens on purely personal matters are left 
with neither constitutional protection for their speech, nor recourse or 
remedy for their subsequent dismissals stemming from that speech when 
the Pickering-Connick analysis is applied to their private, online speech.158  
Nonetheless, teachers continue to challenge school boards across the 
nation for what is deemed unprotected speech.159  School districts and 
                                                 
154 See Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We nevertheless affirm 
the summary judgment because Richerson’s transfer was appropriate under the balancing 
test laid out in Pickering v. Board of Education.”) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. 
H.S. Dist. 205, Will, Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)). 
155 Richerson v. Beckon, No. C07-5590 JKA, 2008 WL 833076, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 27, 
2008); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (holding that if a public employee’s speech does not touch 
on a matter of public concern, the judiciary should not scrutinize the reasons for that 
employee’s dismissal).  The court held that public employers “enjoy wide latitude” in 
supervising and dismissing employees, and the courts should not be implicated each time a 
public employee is dismissed for her speech.  Id.  If the employee is not speaking about a 
matter of public concern, but rather only upon a matter of personal interest, a federal court 
is not the appropriate forum for reviewing the employer’s decision.  Id. 
156 See Richerson, 337 F. App’x at 638 (contending that Richerson’s blog was publically-
available and included “several highly personal and vituperative comments about her 
employers, union representatives, and fellow teachers”).  The court found that Richerson’s 
speech on her blog constituted an “actual injury to the school’s legitimate interests.”  Id. at 
639.  Furthermore, the court held that “a public employee’s speech [that] touches on 
matters of public concern is a ‘necessary, but not a sufficient condition of constitutional 
protection.’”  Id. 
157 See infra Part IV (discussing when the application of the Pickering-Connick analysis is 
appropriate for teacher’s speech via social networking sites). 
158 See Ramasastry, supra note 58 (providing that Senate Bill 54’s sponsor, Senator 
Cunningham, “argued that all she wanted to do was to limit ‘hidden communications’ 
between teachers and students, which could not be monitored readily by parents or school 
administrators”).  “Cunningham focused on the fact that in certain instances, teachers may 
have sexually exploited children who were under their supervision—and that some 
communications, in those instances, involved social networking sites.”  Id. 
159 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (providing an example of the elements 
required for drafting written school district policies concerning teacher-student 
communication in response to the passage of Missouri’s statute). 
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the Missouri legislature, in an unsuccessful attempt to offer a solution to 
school boards’ concerns arising from teachers’ online speech, have 
unconstitutionally restricted teachers’ private speech.160 
E. Missouri’s Overbroad and Vague “Facebook” Law 
The Missouri legislature has imposed an overbroad and vague 
statute that restricts teachers’ social networking use.161  Senate Bill 
Number 54 prohibits every teacher in Missouri from having any 
“nonwork-related internet site which allows exclusive access with a 
current or former student.”162  Although the statute aims to protect 
school districts from situations whereby teachers cast a negative light on 
the school district, the standard set by the Missouri legislature extends 
too far.163  First, the statute is unclear as to who is considered a current or 
former student.164  The statute’s opponents, particularly the Missouri 
State Teachers Association, point to the fact that former students could 
include any student that a teacher taught in the classroom or any student 
attending a teacher’s school.165  Failing to adequately define “student” 
                                                 
160 See infra Part II.B (describing Missouri’s statute restricting both teacher-student 
communication and teachers’ private speech via social networking sites, such as Facebook). 
161 See Potter, supra note 57 (stating that the law was “meant to protect children from 
sexual predators at school”).  Additionally, Senator Jane Cunningham, the statute’s chief 
sponsor, stated that “the law is not nearly as onerous as teachers and school districts 
claim,” citing an Associated Press investigation that found that 87 Missouri teachers lost 
their licenses because of sexual misconduct.  Id.  Senator Cunningham stated the following:  
This legislation is vital to protect our children from sexual predators in 
our schools—places meant as safe learning environments.  Aside from 
mandatory extensive background checks, my bill will make it possible 
for school officials to be aware of sexual misconduct exhibited by 
potential hires and their employees when making staffing decisions.  
This will serve as an invaluable tool for protecting our children. 
Cunningham, supra note 57. 
162 S.B. 54, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., at 14, ¶4 (Mo. 2011), 
http://www.senate.mo.gov/11info/pdf-bill/intro/SB54.pdf. 
163 See Cunningham, supra note 57 (“[The] legislation is vital to protect our children from 
sexual predators in our schools—places meant as safe learning environments.”).  Senator 
Cunningham goes on to say, “Aside from mandatory extensive background checks, my bill 
will make it possible for school officials to be aware of sexual misconduct exhibited by 
potential hires and their employees when making staffing decisions.  This will serve as an 
invaluable tool for protecting our children.”  Id. 
164 See S.B. 54, 96th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., at 14, ¶2 (Mo. 2011), 
http://www.senate.mo.gov/11info/pdf-bill/intro/SB54.pdf. (providing that although the 
statute states that “former student” includes “any person who was at one time a student at 
the school at which the teacher is employed and who is eighteen years of age or less and 
who has not graduated;” many critics argue the ambiguity of the word “former”). 
165  See Facebook Movement Opposes Missouri Law, ABC NEWS VIDEO (Aug. 23, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/video/facebook-movement-opposes-missouri-law-
14366793 (depicting the statute’s ambiguities in the exact meaning of “former student”). 
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imposes an unduly burdensome expectation on teachers because it does 
not take into consideration complications that may arise.166  For example, 
if a teacher transfers into another school district, there is no clear 
indication as to whether students in a teacher’s former school or school 
district are still considered a “former student” as the statute’s language 
imposes.167  The statute is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to 
provide clear language as to who the teacher is prohibited from 
communicating with, which is the chief concern and purpose of the 
legislation itself.168 
Another problem is that the statute makes it unlawful for teachers to 
“establish, maintain, or use a work-related internet site unless such site is 
available to school administrators and the child’s legal custodian, 
physical custodian, or legal guardian.”169  Therefore, teachers who are 
parents and their children who are students are essentially prohibited 
from communicating via non-work related websites such as Facebook.170  
The statute also is void on its face because it stifles a teachers’s freedom 
of personal choice in family matters, which is protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.171  The statute unlawfully 
intrudes upon teachers’ religious freedom and right of association by 
making it unlawful to communicate with youth leaders, church 
                                                 
166 Id. 
167 See S.B. 54, 96th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., at 14, (Mo. 2011), 
http://www.senate.mo.gov/11info/pdf-bill/intro/SB54.pdf. (explaining that “exclusive 
access”  is “the information on the website [] available only to the owner (teacher) and user 
(student) by mutual explicit consent and where third parties have no access to the 
information on the website absent an explicit consent agreement with the owner 
(teacher)”). 
168 See Petition for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Judgment, supra note 60, at 3, ¶14 
(“The Act is so vague and overbroad that the Plaintiffs cannot know with confidence what 
conduct is permitted and what is prohibited[.]”). 
169 S.B. 54, 96th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., at 14, ¶2 (Mo. 2011), 
http://www.senate.mo.gov/11info/pdf-bill/intro/SB54.pdf. 
170 See Petition for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Judgment, supra note 60, at 5, ¶ 20(a) 
(“The Act would ban and make unlawful communications via non-work-related websites 
and other social networking sites between parent who are teachers and their children who 
are students.”). 
171 See id. at 5, ¶ 20(c) (“The Act interferes with the rights of parents and guardians to 
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control, and places a significant 
infringement on a fundamental right.”).  The Missouri Teachers Association continues, 
“[p]arents have a recognized liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their 
children, and the Act would deprive parents of a means of communicating with their 
children without having afforded the parent a pre- or post-deprivation hearing.” Id. at 5, 
¶ 20(e). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 1 [2012], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss1/4
2012] Facebook Off Limits? 159 
members, or even newspaper reporters without the consent of the 
student’s legal custodian or guardian.172 
Last, the statute offends teachers’ academic and instructional rights 
because it potentially prohibits other communication sites, such as 
“Blackboard, Virtual Classroom, Angel, and other sites commonly used 
by teachers for online classes and distance learning.”173  Prohibiting such 
communication would be detrimental to both teachers and students, 
because online teacher-student interaction is not only one of the most 
effective teaching tools for teachers, but it is also one of the most 
valuable means for student learning.174  By expressly prohibiting 
teachers from communicating with students online through messages or 
chats, teachers are getting a clear message that Facebook should simply 
be off limits, even if a teacher’s social networking use entails 
communication with his or her students.175  The statute assumes that 
teachers do not have the best judgment, which runs contrary to the 
school board’s beliefs and expectations that all teachers should behave 
ethically and in a professional manner with their students.176  The statute 
not only infringes on teachers’ purely private or out-of-the-classroom 
speech, but it also acts as a prior restraint on a teacher’s form of 
expression.177  Whether teachers’ private speech is unconstitutionally 
restricted by the legislatures or incorrectly examined and analyzed by 
the courts, it must be protected.178  Therefore, a change in the judicial test 
applied by courts in teachers’ online speech cases is necessary to protect 
                                                 
172 See id. at 3, ¶ 12 (discussing the statute’s restriction of many popular and “increasingly 
indispensable computer and cell phone based technologies in wide-spread use in society 
today”).  The Missouri State Teachers Association argued that the statute “unlawfully 
intrudes upon [the Missouri State Teachers Association’s] religious freedom and right of 
association granted to [the Teachers Association] in Article I, Section 5 of the Missouri 
Constitution, and the [F]irst [A]mendment and the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment of the 
United States Constitution.”  Id. at 6, ¶ 21. 
173 Id. at 3, ¶ 13. 
174 See supra note 40 (discussing the various educational benefits of online interaction for 
both teachers and students). 
175 See supra notes 24–26 (discussing the implications of teachers’ Facebook use). 
176 See Interview with Todd Fuller, supra note 103 (proclaiming that many teachers view 
legislative statutes as unnecessary because state administrative codes already address how 
teachers should conduct themselves within the education profession). 
177 See Petition for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Judgment, supra note 60, at 4, ¶ 19(a) 
(arguing that the statute acts as a prior restraint on teachers’ freedom of expression). 
178 See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the importance of protecting the rights of teachers in 
their speech); see also infra Part IV (proposing a new test to ensure protection of private 
speech made by teachers on online social media sites). 
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the rights of teachers while maintaining the high standard of 
professionalism expected by school boards.179 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
The Court’s current analysis for deciding whether a teachers’ speech 
is protected should not apply to teachers who speak as private citizens 
on purely private matters via social networking sites.180  Unfortunately, 
addressing all forms of teachers’ online speech under the Pickering-
Connick approach leaves teachers’ private speech, which would 
otherwise be wholly protected absent social networking mediums, 
unprotected.181  Courts are striking down teachers’ First Amendment 
claims because, under Pickering-Connick, most social networking speech 
is not considered a matter of public concern and therefore fails the first 
prong of the Supreme Court’s analysis articulated in Pickering.182  To 
protect teachers’ speech as applied to social networking sites, the courts 
must first address whether the Pickering-Connick analysis is in fact 
applicable.183  This Note proposes a preliminary test to help courts 
ascertain whether the Pickering-Connick approach should be applied. 
In addressing teachers’ online speech, the courts should (1) 
determine whether the content of the speech is purely private and then 
(2) identify if the speaker is acting as a private citizen or a public 
employee.  Only after both steps are completed can the courts determine 
whether application of the Pickering-Connick analysis is appropriate.184 
                                                 
179 See infra Part IV (proposing a judicial standard that courts can consistently apply to 
teachers’ online speech cases). 
180 See supra Part III.C (arguing the inapplicability of Connick’s public concern test to cases 
involving restrictions of teachers’ speech on online social networking sites). 
181 See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing teachers’ First Amendment interest in expressing 
themselves regardless of whether it is through a column in the newspaper or through a 
post on Facebook). 
182 See supra Part II.C (discussing the courts’ dismissal of the First Amendment claims 
concerning speech via social networking sites in Synder and Spanierman). 
183 See infra text accompanying 183 (proposing a test that courts should apply when 
assessing teachers’ social networking speech). 
184 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. H.S. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 
(1968) (discussing (1) whether the speech that led to the adverse employment action related 
to a matter of public concern, and (2) whether, under the balancing test, the public 
employer can demonstrate that its legitimate interests outweigh the employee’s First 
Amendment rights). 
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A. Identifying the Content of the Speech 
Under the proposed test, the first step is to determine whether the 
content of the speech is purely private.185  By first assessing the content 
of a teacher’s speech, courts can decide whether, if at all, the Pickering-
Connick analysis is applicable.186  Teachers’ online speech can be 
organized through a spectrum of speech including:  (1) purely private 
speech, (2) political or social speech, and (3) speech relating to 
employment.187  At one end of the spectrum lies teachers’ purely private 
speech, which is the furthest from application of the Pickering-Connick 
analysis and the most protected under the First Amendment.188  At the 
other end of the spectrum lies speech relating to a teachers’ employment, 
which is the closest to the application of the Pickering-Connick analysis 
and presumably the least protected type of speech.189 
More specifically, purely private speech includes personal posts and 
blogs via social networking sites.190  This speech most commonly 
includes private behavior, such as posting personal comments or photos 
online.  Private speech also includes drinking, running a marathon, 
using profanity, congratulating a newlywed couple, or presumably 
talking about similar matters with friends online.191  The courts can 
easily identify this type of private speech by asking whether a teacher 
would hold these same conversations with their friends and relatives in 
person, through the telephone, letters or e-mail.192  This type of speech 
has nothing to do with the teachers’ professional work and therefore 
should be the most protected under the First Amendment, because it is 
purely private speech.193 
                                                 
185 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
186 See supra Part II.C (explaining the test as provided by Pickering and Connick). 
187 See supra Part II.C (describing cases concerning purely private, political, and work-
related speech). 
188 See supra Part III.D (analyzing the decisions in Pickering and Connick). 
189 See Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Richerson’s transfer 
was appropriate under the balancing test laid out in Pickering . . . . [H]er publicly-available 
blog included several highly personal and vituperative comments about her employers, 
union representatives, and fellow teachers.”) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. 563). 
190 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing social media sites as a way to 
share private information, such as a thought or feeling). 
191 See supra Part II.A (discussing the various reasons and interests in communicating on 
social networking sites). 
192 See supra text accompanying note 16 (explaining how social media sites are quickly 
becoming a substitute for a telephone call, an email, or even a text message). 
193 See supra Part II.C (describing the types of speech that are subject to the most exacting 
of First Amendment protection). 
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The middle of the spectrum consists of political and social speech via 
social networking sites.194  This speech includes commenting about a 
war, abortion, marijuana legalization, or politics, for example.195  The 
courts can identify this speech by looking into both the purpose behind 
the speech, whether it is the subject of legitimate news interest, and 
whether the speech was intended for a public audience.196  If answered 
in the affirmative, this type of speech is most likely political or social 
speech and is thus protected by the First Amendment because it is core 
political speech.197 
At the opposite end of the spectrum is speech that is intimately 
related to the speaker’s employment.198  This speech includes a speaker’s 
personal grievances about his or her job, whether it includes criticizing 
the principal and the school district or commenting about the speaker’s 
students online.199  The courts can easily identify this type of speech by 
determining whether the speech has a direct impact on the speaker’s 
employment and whether the speech would likely have an impact on the 
speaker’s relationship with supervisors, co-workers, and students.200  By 
categorizing the content of a teacher’s speech within that spectrum, the 
court is one step closer to determining the second part of the proposed 
test, which requires a court to characterize the identity of the speaker 
either as a private citizen or public employee.201 
B. Identifying the Speaker 
In the second step of the proposed test, once the content of the 
speech is determined to be purely private, political or social, or work-
related, the court must then resolve whether the speaker is speaking as a 
                                                 
194 See Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310 (D. Conn. 2008) (holding that a 
poem about the Iraq War on Spanierman’s Myspace page could be considered political 
speech). 
195 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983) (finding that some of Connick’s 
questionnaire included speech about political pressure placed on employees to work on 
political campaigns). 
196 See supra Part III.C (analyzing Connick’s public concern test relating to the context and 
content of speech). 
197 See Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691, 699 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that the college 
instructor’s speech was political because the speech concerned a public rally and march 
opposing the World Trade Organization). 
198 See supra Part III (explaining that speech that is a matter of public concern may be 
regulated by the State). 
199 See supra text accompanying note 182–83 (proposing a new test that should be 
adopted to help determine whether Pickering-Connick should be applied). 
200 See supra Part III.A (analyzing the competing interests at stake when teachers speak 
though social media sites). 
201 See supra text accompanying notes 182–85 (defining the proposed test that should be 
entered into when analyzing teachers’ speech through social media). 
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private citizen or a public employee.202  If the content of the speech is 
purely private, the speaker is speaking as a private citizen and thus 
should be afforded complete First Amendment protection.203  Whether it 
is updating a status on Facebook about drinking the night before or 
posting a picture wearing a bikini, the teacher is speaking about purely 
private matters, which have nothing to do with her employment and 
position as a teacher.  When Lisa posts a picture of herself holding a 
glass of wine, she is not acting as Ms. Hall, but as Lisa Hall.  This is not 
to say, however, that school boards give up their discretion in 
disciplining teachers’ behavior.  Teachers may still be disciplined for 
conduct that may be “immoral” or “unbecoming” to the teaching 
profession.204  However, this a distinction that both the courts, in 
addressing claims, and teachers, in pleading their cases, must recognize 
as a disciplinary issue, rather than a First Amendment issue.205  Whether 
a teacher has received adequate notice for what constitutes appropriate 
or inappropriate online behavior that ultimately leads to a teacher’s 
dismissal concerns a teacher’s due process rights, not the First 
Amendment—which does not, and should not, regulate a citizen’s 
purely private speech.206 
Accordingly, if the content of the online speech is political or 
intimately related to the speaker’s employment, then the Pickering-
Connick analysis should be applied.207  Under the Pickering-Connick 
analysis, a public employee’s speech is protected when the speaker is 
commenting on matters of public concern, which inherently includes 
                                                 
202 See supra Part III.A (explaining that school districts and administrators, as public 
employers, undoubtedly have an interest not only in fostering an environment that 
promotes effective learning, but also in maintaining its employees’ conduct because 
inappropriate conduct could potentially interfere with that mission). 
203 See supra note 33 (arguing that First Amendment protection is extended to private 
individuals speaking on matters of private concern). 
204 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44434 (West 1999) (recognizing “immoral and unprofessional 
conduct” as a grounds for teacher dismissal); ALASKA STAT. ANN § 14.20.170(2) (West 1999) 
(allowing teacher dismissal for immorality); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-940(a)(4) (2000) (finding 
teachers may be dismissed for immoral conduct); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 168.114(2) 
(1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-501 (1999); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18A-2-8 (West 2000). 
205 See supra Part III.D (discussing how the court in Spanierman failed to acknowledge 
teachers’ academic freedom rights, partly because of an improper pleading of the case). 
206 See supra Part III.B (defining the protection afforded by the First Amendment as 
applied to purely private speech). 
207 Compare Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637, 639 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting 
Richerson’s First Amendment challenge concerning statements made on a personal blog), 
Synder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008) 
(upholding Snyder’s removal and rejecting her free speech challenge), and Spanierman v. 
Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 313 (D. Conn. 2008) (upholding Spanierman’s dismissal and 
rejecting his free speech challenge), with supra Part IV (suggesting that these cases would 
likely have turned out differently under this Note’s proposed method of analysis). 
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political or social speech.208  Thus, a teacher’s online speech on a blog or 
Facebook about a war, abortion, or the legalization of marijuana, would 
be protected under the First Amendment.209  Teachers’ political or social 
speech via social networking sites has a greater likelihood of tipping the 
balance in the teacher’s favor because political speech is at the core of 
protected, First Amendment speech.  Additionally, if a teacher is 
speaking about matters directly relating to his or her employment and 
profession as a teacher, the Pickering-Connick analysis would also be 
applicable.210  However, teachers’ online speech criticizing the school, its 
administrators, or students, will likely fall under personal grievances, 
which is speech that is unprotected under the Pickering-Connick 
analysis.211 
Teachers, just like any other public employees, have lives outside of 
their employment.  Similar to the mailman who leaves the post office at 
the end of day and is no longer considered a public employee but rather 
a private citizen, the teacher who walks out of the classroom and is in the 
privacy of his or her home, is also no longer considered a public 
employee but a private citizen.  Whether it is the mailman or the teacher, 
each speaker is speaking as a private citizen when they sign into their 
Facebook accounts.  However, school boards and administrators argue 
that teachers are unlike all other public employees because of their 
elevated status and unique role they perform in educating our youth.212  
School administrators should have the discretion to draw the line as to 
whether a teacher is speaking as a private citizen or a public employee.213  
By identifying the speaker as a citizen or a public employee after 
addressing the content of teachers’ speech via social networking sites, 
the courts will eliminate such discretion.214 
                                                 
208 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (“The First Amendment was fashioned 
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
209 See supra Part III.B (defining the protection afforded by the First Amendment for 
political or social speech). 
210 See supra text accompanying note 182–88 (providing a model analysis that courts 
should apply before analyzing a teacher’s social media speech claims under the Pickering-
Connick test). 
211  See supra Part III.B–C (explaining that a teacher’s complaints are not protected speech 
under the tests laid out in Pickering and Connick). 
212 See supra Part III.A (describing the unique role that teachers play in educating our 
youth). 
213 See supra Part II.B (describing the Missouri statute that attempts to draw the line for 
teachers’ online speech). 
214 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. H.S. Dist. 205, Will, Cnty., Ill.., 391 U.S. 563, 568 
(1968) (balancing the “interests of the teacher, as a citizen” in commenting upon matters of 
public concern). 
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The proposed test for determining whether the Pickering-Connick 
framework should be applied to teachers’ online speech not only 
protects teachers’ purely private speech, but it also preserves the 
Pickering-Connick framework laid out by the Supreme Court.215  The 
inconsistency among the courts applying the Pickering-Connick analysis is 
a direct result of the Supreme Court’s failure to first identify the content 
of the teacher’s speech.216  However, once the proposed test is applied 
and the content of the teacher’s speech is not identified as a private 
citizen speaking on purely private matters, then the Pickering-Connick 
analysis is correctly applied to online social networking speech.217 
However, this does not imply that inconsistencies will not develop in 
the courts’ application of the proposed test.  Critics will argue that 
identifying the speech as purely private versus political or work-related 
speech may result in some courts incorrectly categorizing the content of 
the teachers’ online speech.218  But by relying on the spectrum of speech 
proposed, ranging from purely private speech at one end of the 
spectrum to public speech falling under the Pickering-Connick analysis at 
the other end of the spectrum, courts identifying the content of the 
speech would properly recognize the distinction between purely private 
versus every other type of speech.219  Therefore, teachers’ purely private 
speech will always be protected, assuming there is no misidentification 
of the content of a teacher’s online speech. 
Critics will also argue that school administrators, parents, and 
communities have a legitimate and superior interest in restricting 
teachers’ online speech because students may see their teachers 
implicitly endorsing alcohol use or exposing students to sexually explicit 
material.220  Although administrators wish to hold teachers to the highest 
moral standard, it is legal for teachers to consume alcohol, use profanity, 
and engage in other adult activities, or discuss those activities with their 
                                                 
215 See supra text accompanying note 185 (providing the proper test that should be 
entered into when analyzing teacher’s speech through social medium). 
216 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance 
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees.”). 
217 See Part IV (proposing a preliminary test that must be applied by the courts when 
assessing teachers’ speech on social media sites). 
218 See supra Part III.D (describing the courts’ misidentification of the content of teachers’ 
speech on social networking sites). 
219 See supra Part IV (suggesting that courts (1) determine whether the content of the 
speech is purely private and (2) identify the speaker either as a private citizen or a public 
employee). 
220 See supra Part II.A.2 (describing school boards’ interest in restricting teachers’ speech 
via social networking sites). 
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friends even if such speech is via an online Facebook posting.221  This is 
not to say that teachers who decide to place inappropriate comments, 
pictures, or videos on social networking sites are not still subject to 
disciplinary action or termination.222  Under no test should courts allow 
such inappropriate speech or conduct to go unpunished.223  The 
proposed test is designed to protect teachers’ purely private speech, 
which was already entitled to First Amendment protection despite any 
technological advancement that transforms the method in which people 
communicate with one another.  The proposed test accomplishes that 
purpose by protecting teachers who are acting as private citizens and 
speaking on purely private matters, eliminating any concerns school 
administrators, parents, or communities may have for permitting 
inappropriate or unprotected speech that may disrupt students’ learning 
environment.224 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Regulation of teachers’ online speech, whether through a statute, 
district-level policy, or acceptable use agreement, creates First 
Amendment concerns when teachers’ online speech consists of purely 
personal matters.  Such limitations have caused school boards to impose 
disciplinary actions against teachers for their purely private speech.  
Under the Pickering-Connick approach, almost all of teachers’ online 
speech is categorized as matters of private concern, and, as a result, 
teachers unwillingly forfeit their First Amendment claims merely 
because they decided to express their private speech through a posting 
on Facebook, rather than talking to a friend in the privacy of their homes.  
Despite this parallelism, the courts, under the Pickering-Connick analysis, 
have concluded that teachers’ online speech is unprotected.  The 
proposed preliminary test is designed to assist courts in distinguishing 
purely private speech from any other type of online speech; thus, it acts 
as a guideline to whether the Pickering-Connick analysis should even be 
applicable.  It also aids to prevent the courts’ misapplication of the 
                                                 
221 See supra text accompanying note 112 (explaining that because public school teachers 
play a unique role in shaping the minds of our youth, teachers are held to higher standard 
of professionalism and moral character). 
222 See supra Part II.B (depicting various grounds for disciplinary action against teachers, 
such as incompetence, negligence of duty, substantial noncompliance with school laws, 
insubordination, and immoral conduct). 
223 See supra note 25 (detailing numerous examples of teachers who were, or are, 
currently under investigation or have been dismissed for their inappropriate conduct on 
social networking sties). 
224 See supra text accompanying note 50 (describing the legitimate interest schools have in 
maintaining a professional rapport between teachers and students). 
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Pickering-Connick analysis by limiting its application to the appropriate 
type of speech. 
The proposed test protects Lisa and any other teacher who posts a 
photo of herself standing on the beach holding an alcoholic beverage on 
her Facebook profile.225  Under the current application of the Pickering-
Connick analysis, Lisa would likely lose her First Amendment claim 
because her speech is not considered a matter of public concern.  
However, under the proposed test courts would easily recognize that the 
photo is a purely private expression by a private citizen and, therefore, 
enjoys First Amendment protection.  On the other hand, even if courts 
determine that Michelle’s online speech is purely private, and therefore 
protected, school boards still maintain the authority to discipline clearly 
inappropriate speech or conduct.226  Although the proposed test is 
intended to protect teachers’ purely private speech under the First 
Amendment, such inappropriate speech or conduct that crosses the 
teacher-student boundary is not exempt from discipline by school boards 
and administrators.  The proposed test protects teachers’ purely private 
speech while simultaneously giving school administrators the discretion 
to determine the best interests of the students and all parties involved. 
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225 See supra text accompanying note 1 (detailing a hypothetical situation that 
contextualizes the problems addressed by this Note). 
226 See supra text accompanying note 2 (detailing a second hypothetical situation that 
contextualizes the problems addressed by this Note). 
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